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~ TRACT 
Direct Americ an interest i n Sout hern Asi a began onl y 
a ft er the Se c nd \Jorld ar as a ;:ce u lt of three conf encin g 
even ts whi ch ent i re y ch anged th e ··:e s tern -orie nted power pat t ern 
i n t he hole of Asi • 
LU 
One of th ese events was th e demission i n 
of th e Imperial West from all 6r it s mor •Ort an t colonial 
out posts i n Asi a . Agai ns t a brckground of cen t uri es of exp~oi -
t ati on an d humili a tio n , th i s _arting bade fair to be permanent ; 
i.e ., any Western r e t 1.rn i n the old s tyl e had become 1m ossible 
in t~ e f orse eabl e future . 
c::J) The s ec ond event was of mor- direct conc e r n t o t he 
United t at es . Bef ore nd d· 1 1 
i n s ia wa.s centre d around-..J...a.pa~_~n~ ~hina , th e f or mer as a ,__ ____ _ 
threat to be t amed a.Y1d the latt er as her 1ar d and f tu re hope., 
promising a vast otenti al for i nvestments , tr ad e , and cult u ... 
ral and r .:l i gious ac tiviti e .. With Chi ang Kai - sriek.1 s defe ~t 
by Co.mmuni t f orces i n 1949 all t lis changed , eausing a. wave 
of outcry by cer~ ai n olitic· 1 forc es to an ext ent rarely 
para ll eled i n American history . The subsequent P.ed Ch i nese 
i n t er ve1 tion i n the ·~or ean War force d the Unite St a te s 
governmen t into an "agonising reapproisaln of its policies 
in th e Orient . 
The third even t v:hich was dest i ned t o count so much in 
Sou th ern SiQi, but which t he Right v'1ng rtAsi dl a tiouists were 
mentally unprepa r ed to a cc e.pt , v,as the emer gen ce of •,hGl. t h.as 
iii . 
been called ~neutr .,•lism 11 in some of the ke y countries of the 
region •. 
All these trends had become cle · r by l::¼51. v-?hat wa.~ t; e 
ret:t.ction of the United tates to tM e t~ends? Eo•..-did he set 
about reorientir~ her a tti t.ude · nd o icies during the ye , rs 
of' readjustment? 
These ... uestio ns have ·been studied in a f'our --dimens i na l 
context : l) the ch "'ng1ng int e1-r1ational setting; 2-) ;;,he-· p.li1ce 
ot Southern Asia in eric·n intern at io nal 1..nd domestic poli -
cies; 3) the actu~l 1·ormulation of tJ. s . polici e-J in thi s area 
and t he manner of their execution ; a Hit 4) the effects of 
United .St ates a.et.ions on her relations ·1th the co:untries o.f 
th.., region and on the relat:i.ons of these countries 4mon 
the mselv es ,. 
Whi le history· cannot be i gnored in st udying D. hi st-Ori e 1 
period , th e approach ad o.t ed 1n thls r;tudy is top:tcal and 
ana ytic · l rather than chronological . Althou gh r ef erenc ha" 
been .made to pr~c~din g iS.nd $t cc eecii ~ even ts for th® purpose 
of providing a ;p,er$peetive, t he st udy ' s ·Pocus .1as been on 
the first t :o years oi' the 1,i S<:mhower Ad1ni istr ~tion . 
The research fin.o.ings of t.b:L:. st u dy indicate th t 
·nited 'tate pol icies ' to v,ards Southe rn Asia during l9-Q3 ar~d 
l-954 ·ere based on out dated and internB .lly inconsistrmt 
postu ates . They pr~duc ed nsol1tionsr.t whi ch were related. 1·'' 
neither to t' _ inter nat ion al is sues of the time no r to the 
actual pr oblems of the area . as a c-onsei uence, they te nded 
to b e i :ne f rect i ve and se lf - defe · tine; •. 
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PREF- CE 
The idea of this st udy develope d fro m a research paper 
on the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation whi ch I wrote earlier 
for Professor David D. Warren. Most of the writers on Beato I 
happened to read tended to examine it mai ly in terms of th e ·-
Treaty which cre ated it. This approach s e emed to me to be onl. 
partially satisfactory . It left one cr ucial question una n s·rnred: 
Wny would such a powerful nat io n as the United States want to 
asrociate herself with a proµosition which, at its best , suc -
ceed ed only · in attracting na tions whose particularis.t aims 
scarcely coinci ded ~th her own, and which, at its orst, 
seemed to have resulted in a1.ienating a large segment of the 
Asian sentiment? I :i:'ou.nd little h el ) fr om official authors 
fr om Seato countries v·ho generally offered facile defe .!.Se 
from their position of prior commitment. SimiL, .rly , s okesmen 
for the non - member ssian governments ~ppeared to react emo-
tionalLy to what they had already r e jecte d in D • .!. a.C"t • 
It was be ca use of dis i ntellectu~l dissatisfaction 
that I deci ded to enlarge t.he periscope to i n clude t he overal l 
domest ic and inte nation conte xt fr om whi ch .American de cision-
makers at that time would have loo k ed at Southern Asia . In 
t his app roac h Se - to becomes only one expression of a many-
f a cete d policy matrix . It is hoped that my effort will he l p 
expl· i n this phase of U •• policies more cle ar l y . 
y debts a re man , an d not a l way s iaenti f i abl e . The 
members of th e Thesis Committee na tur.l y h ave_ 1.he f i r s t cl a.i m• 
Ao· ever, Professor Robert F. Smit h i s p rticularl entitl ed 
Vi i 
to my gr ati t · de. To h i m I owe a huge i n t e ll ect a deb t. I t 
i my pleas r e to a c nov..led 0 e the un ersta .din g and he l p I 
receive d fr om Dr . Geor ge Goodwi n , Caa i rman of he Depa rt men t 
01 Pol~ ti ca l Sci ence and. ea _ "r !l ~st V:. Hartuaf:; o the 
n radua t e cch ool. .1i t ho1.:t t he unlim t ed caoper<i tion and di. ·patch 
vii t i. -vh · c_ rofessor Francis Allen and ot her members of ' t he 
· ni ver .s i t y Li brary he l ped me in ob taiDi ng ma"-erials ~ r o m 
e sev:here t ~is ork coulc. no t ha ve b ,en compl eted hi t l,in t he 
tim e at~ ctisp o a . 
\Vhen I go ba c l{ to my count r y I shal l alv-ays l ook ba ck 
on my st;;;.y a t the University of H ode Is and iJJith t he fonde t 
memori es . 
.!iiiay 7-1, 1963. p • . K . 

I. IN TRODUCTI ON 
The Geographic Region 
This study will examine t he post- Kor ean War pha se 
of United Sta tes rel a tions wit h the mainl and and island 
countries constit u tin g the great .Asian arc fro m Afghanistan 
in the North west to the Phili pp ines in the Sm,1theast. 
Unhappily , a terminolo gy acce ptable to a ll to 
describe the a rea ha s yet to be fou nd . The phr a se ' Sout h 
and South ea st Asia ' has . ga ine d wi de currenc y durin g r ece nt 
years , th anks largel y to the ~mer ic an university cir cles 
and th eir are a study progr ams. Nevert h eless , t hese terms 
have mean t different t hi n gs to the h i storian, ge ogr aphe r, 
an d ge opol i tici an . 
Pr ofessor Jos eph E. Spencer of the Univ e rsi t y of 
Ca lifor n i a , Los Ang eles,, used the ex:pressi o·n ttA.s i a ., South by 
East 11• The U. S. State Department Geogr apher, Mr. G. Etzel 
Pe a rcy emplo y s the phonetic all y monstrous var i atio n : 
11Geograph ic Regions of Asia: South and Eas t 1·1 • Dr . Russel 
R . F'ifiel d , a politic al scientist , i n the cur rent fa shion 
among &.ca.demie writ e rs , favors the dic hotomo u s "South Asia 11 
an d ''S outheast Asia. 11 as t he 11poli t .ic al areat 1 cl ass ific a ti on . 
1'he Chin es e ref e r to I Southeast As ia t· a s Nanya.ng_ 
( lit eral ly , ns outh Oeean 1r) ~ The J apanese us e the sa me t e rm, 
but pronounce it Narrl.Q. The Austr ' .lians look at it as 11Near 
No.rt hn, an d the In d.ians f avor a mor e endea rin g term , °Furt h er 
In dia. 11, citi ng t he i r substan ti a l h istoric a l and cult u r a l 
t ie s wi th the atea . 
Afgha ni t · n is co nsidered by many , a s c,lso Wes t Pakis -
t an by some for s ome purpos e s , to h av e gr e a ter af "'i ni t y 'Nit h 
the area var i ous ly describ ed as Mi ddle East , Near East , or 
Centr a l ii s ia. Ceylon is i ncluded by some wit h I nd i a in 11Sout h 
Asian nd i n nsou t he a st As1a 1r by ot h ers. 'I'he Philipp i n es 
t ends t o be pla ced in ns outheast 11.sia" by mer ic ans but not 
by the British. 
To avo i d all t h is mult i l e verbi age and to stee r 
cle ar of the nationalistic prefere n ce, for our purpose we 
shall ad opt tJ:1e gener i c term, 11Southern Asia 111, af t e r 
Profess or Charles Wolf , Jr. 2 , to denot e t he entir e area f~om. 
fghanistan to t he Phil i pp in es i ncl u in g the In do- Pacific 
oceanic island coun t ries on the way . 
It s Internati onal Impor tan c e 
Afgh anis t an , t he t wo part s of Paki stan (Ea.st and West) , 
I nd i a , Ne pal, Si k~·i m, Bhuta.n , Ceylon , Burma , Th il and , Cambo-
d i a , Laos, the tv,o Vietn ams (Nort h and South) , Malaya , the 
I ndone si a arch i pela o, an d the Phili pp ines: the"'e fourt een 
countri es h ave an area of ab out 3 . ?. mi llio n snuare miles and 
a po pulat i on of ov er 675 million$ Cul turally and · e t hni ca l l y , 
1 . Ther e v1i ll , hov,e v er , be occa s i "nS whe ·1 we wil l hav e to 
refer separat ely to the Phili p pi nes , In donesia , Tha il ~nd , 
Viet - nam, Laos, Cambodi a , Malay a and Burma a s a gro u rii ng . 
We will then use the coll e ctiv e term " Southea s t As ia '1 • 
2 , Forei ~n Aid : The o~ and Pr a ct ic e in Sou ther n Asia 
(Pr i ncet on ; Prin ceton University Press , 196 
3 
the region exhibits e. puz ··l in g array of diverse s tr nds. Its 
t hre e hundred spoken languages and the presence within it of 
net1.rly every reli gion of the · world -- udh isrn , Chr ist ianity , 
Hi ndu :i..sm, Isl am, Zorastr i ani.s::n, and some u i q_ue sy nt heses 
like Cao Dai and Hao Hao- -i llustr a te the point . Yet, ther e is 
enou gh of a communit y of sh ared pa st and of ·prese nt problems 
and aspir . tio n s that lends this ' free arc of Asia' a cert a in 
homogeneity and character. 
Together, these countries supply more th an 90 percent 
of the ~orld ' s rubber, t ea , and jute and ov er 85 per cen t of 
i ts rice . The West ' s substantial dependence on this area ' s 
tre mendous out put of such essenti ~l ind ustria l ra w mat eri als 
a s tin, mi ca , manganese, iron or e , chrome or e , and t ungs t en 
is ac··nov ledged. Its potential as a market for the goo ds of 
the more industrialised nati on s i s dependent on its own 
economic betterment but has a lready been and must remai n a 
big consider a tion in their thinking of this re gi on . 
Lying as it does astri e the mr:tin "'ea, la.-rid, and ir 
routes connectin g Europe v,i th the Paci.fie throu ,·h the Mi do.le 
East , it s strategic import ance is ~ell understood . The region's 
des cri pt ion as part of a "gre a t ar c of free dom around the c enter 
of Communi s t pO'irnr i n sian3 is a recent Ameri c an fe ather in 
its cap. 
3. Mutual Se curit Proo-ram Fisc a l . Year 1956: A Summarv 
St atement .Washi ng t on : Foreign Oper a tion.:1 Ad.ministration, 
May , 1955), pp . 43 - 47 . 
U. S. and Southern Asia 
i n Cc1.onial Pa st 
4 
Up to the tim e of h er I:>.: .  rticipa t i on i n t h First World 
of the Unite d Stat es 
Vi.ar the tradition a l policy/vis - r - vis the Eu ropean Impe ri ·• 1 
Po vers has been ap tl y summed u p i n Alfred Thayer Mahan ' s 
famous triolo gy: • "'In America: Predominanc e ", 1~1n Eur op e: 
Abstent i on" , an nrn Asi a: Cooperation 11 • 
ttCooperat ion" i n Asi a t as epitomized i n the c el ebrated 
trQpen Door" polic y whic h , to use a metaphor , was esse n tiall Y' 
n .'olyand rousn in conce ptio n : the basic ide a bei ng t hc:,t every -
body should have equaL a ccess t a territory. It fell tc Cnin a 
t o be the proving ground f or this "coop erat i on", and it was 
pr i mar i ly Chi na ' s gre<:1.t mysti o2l, magnetic pul l whic h had 
made the United Sta t es 11poten ti ally a Pc..cific po«er since 
1805 , actually i nce 1846, empha t ically afte r 1867 114, verily 
since 1898 and unq_uestionably after Word War II . 
Chi na 's charm i~ fa c t never bloomed i nto a vast open 
market ., nor did the Chine e cha :w.ge into a nci vilized , Chris ti -:::.111· 
peo le. Its teeming mill i ons nonet h eless never lost the attra c-
t:lon a ~d a l ways re mained an irresistibl e future hope till 
Mao Tse - t"Ung was charged v'.'ith having ple: .. ted nco-munist 
witc he s 11 in the "-'tate Depart111ent who 11h · nded over'r the Chin a 
app le to h i m. 
Al thou gh t here were earl i er speradic for ays , Aneric a ' s 
4 . Samuel Fla gg Be,, ts, A Short History of Amer i c an Foreig n 
., Polic :y and Di plomacy (Mew ?ork: Ri nehart , 1959 ), p . 297 . 
Profess or Bemi s ' famous ev a lu at i on of the Ph ilippines 
acquisitio n as 11the great abe r ratiorll would seem to be 
inconsist ent with this st a t ement. 
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planned en t re e i n to · the Pacific and Chi na bec ame possi ble 
only •.-1 t 1 t he wrest i ng of the Phil ipp ines fro m pa i n i n 189~ . 
To sa.fe guard. t h is a vant gc1rde of ' ma.nifest de st iny ' in the 
Pa cific, the United St ates had to build a co s tl y spider ne t of 
nav al bases , fuel stations, an d co mmuni c a ti on ·. A first - ra te 
nav al base ,as built at Pe~rl Harbor an d fo r tifi ca t ion of 
Gua.m, Vtake I~ ,l and , Mi dway w,c1s initiate d at th e be gi nn i kg of 
the Secon d Worl d War . 
Wi th the British , the Dutc h , the Fr en ch , the Portu -
gue s e and tne Germans fir mly entr er-ch ed in most of Sout he rn 
Asia , Australi a and New Zealand ., th e Americ ans had n ei t h er 
the ch c:tn ce to l ook ·~ est -- and so .lthwarci of t he Philip p ines 
for ex pans i on, nor, conse qu en tly , th e nece ss i t y f or- bu ildin g 
defense s ag ai nst th ese fl anks, thanks to the polic y of 
"coop er a t i on n . Her ma i n challenger arose fro m r a th er unex -
pected quarters ; the Orien t al par ven u J a pan . 
Before and f'or so me time du ri ng t he Russo - J ap· nese 
~ar of 1905 ., Theodort :; Roose velt h ad e.dopted an a tti t de of 
en coura gi ng t he Nip pones e as a coun ter to Russi a ' s de si gns 
i n th e Far E~ st. But , th e r e£;,fte:r. , Sap an ' s gr o\dng stre ng th 
and aggr ess iv e eye on the uopen doortt i n Chi na caused a sor t 
of undec l a r ed ucol d :,\a:rn •:,i t h. the United ta.t e s:, a nd, i n tim e , 
t he t.o became the ch ief contenders i n the Pacifi c. Even tu all y , 
on y th e .American .:r,i vht in the Pa cific C ' e to be ch ec k on 
J a an " s amb.i tio ns ·of a. ttGr ea t er Asian or t h e nasia. n Ca-
Pros perity Sphere" . 
The m-an in g ofr the 5 5 3 rati o of naval stre ngth 
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prescribed by the ~ashingt n Trea~af t er the Fir : t World 
'fa.r , combi ned with the stra te gic tr:b angu.lar ho J..d of Angl o-
.America n forces in Rong Kong , Ma~ila , and Sin gapor~was no t 
lost on th~) J · p~n ese . U. S .- J e.punose r e l at ion s ~•rogressively 
deteriorated thereafter an d culminat ed i n tot a l hostilities 
during the Second World War an d "'n equally tota l d .feat fo r 
J apan . 
Thus s.t the end of the Se co nd War the United -~ta tes 
emer 6 ed supr eme in the Pa cifi.c. J apar.. l a./ prost r at e an.d the 
Wa.r had, left the otl1er Pov,·ers in no posit.ion to chall eng e 
the U. ' . position. But with this s';.lpremac y cams · o-ther and 
more menacing challen ges whicl:. were soon t o i n volve the 
Uni te d St a tes on. a wor1.d-v;iue scale and i n a rea s which ha d 
be ,en of so little concern to her thus far~ 
As this rapid survey sho ::ds tl1e Unite d States had been 
primaril y concerned with J"apa n and China i:n • the Pacific, 
a lbeit in dif'fe!"ent wa:ye • .:'"ar connecti ons w.1. th th e countr i es 
ln South e rn Asia. were s_pe.rin g . She dep en ded 01: t h e Briti..,h 
and othf:r Ufrlendlyn Powers f or t he pr t e~ ti n of' 11,3r minor 
i..nvestme -nts in tin S....fld rubber 1n · alaya a.n ·· in ntbber an 
petro l eum t n I:ndGnesia and her ott er negli gible .:.nterests in 
Burma , Th il rmd , and I n., .. io-C h in a . Her rel~.tions v1ith other 
countries of the area including !nd.ia wer e mainly cul t ural .nd 
on a prive.t 0 plane through Chri s ti an missi. ... n lir·i e s and adu -
ca ti onis ts. By wit htr nwin g from the Phili_pi .e s she had ma de 
oo d her pr.•omi se of 1 34 an.1 ad o:n m ny occasi ons declared 
her sym athy f or freedom from colon "l rule in oth e :r cm ... n t ries 
of t he area , for "Ah i 1:;h they ' 'e re grateful. 
But within h ~l f a decc.de after the War the entir e 
sce n e 1&s tr ansf or med and the United Sta t e s became th e most 
po t ent f act o!· i n th e ;thole of Sou t he rn Asia . 
T:r,y-st With Destiny 
Most of th e fa ctors which pro vi de th e present 
settin 0 i n Southern Asia belon g to recent li st ory , so th,,t 
an enumera tion here i s justif i ed onl y b ec au se of ' th e i r ve ry 
gre at bearin on a pro per undPrs t an din g of th e ev olvin g 
~merican r esp on s e to t hat region ' s probl ems. 
The mos t outst and i ng fac t on the entire Sou the r n 
. s i an sc ene i s t ha t of ch ang e; ch ange fro m a cent ur i es -o ld 
social, politic a l and economic st agnat ion which in the West 
has understandably been term ed as the flrevolt of .A,si an . 
All of these countries wit h the exc ep tion of Tha il : nd 
and .Afghanis.t an . h "'d. beenunde r forei gn domin at ion of on e sort 
or ot he r. 'l'hey h ad be en cha fi ng unde r th1s yoke and in most 
countries na tion a l movements were takin g milit ant char a cter+ 
These nat i ona l strug gle s had gro1m out of genu in e pa triotism 
and 
and loc a l gr iev ances of racial discrimin ati oni ec onomic , an d 
politic al ex ploit at io n . In many resp ects pe opl e wer e i nfe rio r 
i n their own coun tr y . Decisions vi tally affectin g them u..sed 
to be made i n abo ut half a doze n foreign C4p it a l s. 
Th e west ern i d e a s of li be rt y , equ a lity , a nd f r a ter nit }li. 
c nd of c nsti tu tion al g ov·ernme nt had much to do wi th the 
thi nking of th e na tio na l leaders . In additio n , the success of' 
8 
the Communist Revolut i o in Russia 5 , rapi dly chan ging the 
.face b}l.e:. of that agrarian c ount r y in open d fiance o:t' the 
\.est and desp it e its an imosi ty , acted as a great inspira-
ti ona l force , Durin g the War, the Japenese occu pation of 
most of' the Southeastern segment of this re gion had gi ven 
it s people b cer tain t aste of independe nce, however . fi c ti -
tious their par t i ci patio n in the nat i onal administrations 
might ha ve been . 
The su.rprisin. g ease wi th which these areas fell to 
J a pan an d the will i ng coo peration she r ecei ved i n many · 
places pointe d up , as nothin g els e had done before, the 
i mpossi bili ty of defenciing a t err itor y i n the absence of 
loc a l enthusiasm. It also sh owed tha t the industrial base 
. f or modern defense cannot exist i n an economy ord er ed 
pr imar i ly e., - h:y:pothesi , on the n deveiopment n basis. 
All these factors resulted i n an av alanche whi ch by 
1950 si ept the Imperial Po wers out of most of Bo· t hern Asia, 
except Ma laya ~. hi ch f i nal l y became inde pendent in 1957 . The 
t hree In do- Ch i.nese St ates of Vietnam, Lao s , and Ca bodi a lagged• 
-behind.The .F'rench, unde r constant pressure of events and 
Americ· n insistence, d i d gi v e formal reco gnl tion to a 1!fu.ll y 
independe nt and so ver eign State of Vietnam 11 in 1954 6- - the 
5. Whatever happens in Russi a has always exerte d powerful 
1.nr ..Luence on ·th e ne i ghb ori ng .Middle Ea st and As..:an . areas . 
For the impa ct of the non - Communist Revolu t i on of 1905 s ee 
Ivar Spect r , The First Puss1 · ~ Revolht ~on: I ~s I ~act e n 
f3 1~ (Engle wood Clif fs , N.J.: Prentice-H a l l , l.962 . 
6. T1m sepure.te treaties were simul taneo u.sly s i gned , t he 
second · of " assoc i a ti on n with t he }"rench Union . '£he treaties 
wer e ne ver t ~chnicall y put into zorce . 
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l a3t of these States to be so recogn is 0 d-- but still conti -
nue to be there under special treaties of "as soci .tion 11• 
'rhe 6 eneral poverty and illite racy of the entire 
ar~i, u~~ to the colonial pa st, and ttth e revol ution of 
use ·, .. .. dls.X +-evenso±l I s · · f f~mous 
euph emis "", are f actors which must wej_gh in any forei gn 
rel a ti. 011: calculus of these cou"!'l.tries. 
Another factor of very great import unc e , which is 
rather a o r .... produ.c t -of th 0 other fact ors mentioned above, is 
the i rit ene ity of feeling -:ith which the masses of t he people 
loot upo:i th0ir newly ~ron freedom ,;;md on :foreign intentions 
in anyth i ng conc .e!'ning 1~h ei r c0untries . It ma.r b e nothing 
more tha 1 the prc ve rbi E:l once - b .itt en - tvrice - shy a ttit u e; bu t 
it. is there and any ~es te1,n patern@.lism , ho. ever !Nell - mean ing , 
is judged a.ccordin .;l y , whatever the :rulin g elites in c ert ain 
countr1€S m::·y or may not do . 
Regi QnJ!l Rea lit ies 
Durin g the by gone coloni. 1 days th e relations ·jjetween 
the cou nt:r·ies · of th e reg i on ·underwent a metamor pho sis. Next -
door ne i 0 hb ors ·~\ere shu t off from ~a.ch other and whate ver 
lltt e intr a - re gio na l interco urs e exist ed -had to be ttpf;lrmitted 11 
by the posse sing fo r eign power in ea ch country . 
All th is was bound to chan ge afte r in de pena.enc e , a s 
i llus t rated by the increasl:ng.1.y closer consult at ions among 
th e so - c alled As:i.a . neut:cals who h ave kept c.i::ea.r of foreign 
ent a.r1glem.ents . 'Th.ere is no denying the fa ct th a t Afg h anis t an , 
10 
Bhutan , Burma,. Ceylon , I ndia. , I nd ones i a , Cambod ia , Lao ' , 
Mal aya , Nepal , and Sik k i m-- elev en of the fourt een coun tri es 
of 'th e r~~gion --- ha va a eE-rt a i n. i dent i ty o f outlook on the ir 
pre - industrial i .nfrca-r,tr 1.1ct ·.rit1s and. mu t um.l.l y cotn;>et i.ti ve 
t hE!.L. co:1~,lem ent ari t.y is sure t i n cr""as e • .As i t 'i s _. I ndi a , 
be i ng r<cJlativel y more aclv an c(Jd in i ndus tri a li ~ati on, h Si.s 
a l eady bee , he l pin g some of th e s e c.~untr i es <t;j_th t ,:sch ¼ic al 
kn o . - h o. v a rc1., i n 8, fe",fl case s, even with cap i t a.l 5oods . 
Pak i .,.t an ht;iS a su1.•~ l us of xaw j '.:tt e and lon g- st a_;il e cotton 
whic h I ndi a ' s mi l ls c an ai::.d do abs orb . Burm a 's sur ·oln s rice 
ca n b e r egi o 1~1ly ~1sed . To r.nenti.an 0nly a few e,rn.m les . 
In a.ny ge-o- s t .rat egy of tbe a.rec \ I ndia m'.J.s·-: oc:cupy a 
cen ,!'al :pos ttion. Sin gr-:..pore a t t h e he ad of the natu :r·· l 
iH1l ue i n t h e ' ~y poth9tic ~i l event o!. a sea a t t · ck on t h ~ area 
from t he Pacif i c . I ~Acn -si£ too promises t o .av 6 formi dable 
t r &t eg ic p1:, si b ill ti e s i n - U '.:?.h Ln a tta ck . Bimi , a.rly, Af gha -
ni st an , i n the ~•orth wes t and 1..:,•ma; Vietn c,m, Lao s , ~:nd Si kk im, 
"'T~n&. 1, an c"i. Bhut an , h .. i ng C(.'l-!:L!lon bound a ries eit i.17;!' wi th Russi a 
But I ndia, 
·wi t h her lon arc h in g se 3. ': •. a.s t, e.n · t wo t hou. s end. mi l -e .... of 
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common border with Communist Ch i na . .) will eventually ha ve to 
bear the main brunt of ~ny l arge - s cale conv entional -t ype 
inv as i on i n which not onl y the hol <iin g c apacity but the 
lon g .... t e rm sust a :ining po. er woul d be rEiquired. 
Her very loc a tion size, resour c es anci the qual ity 
of her leadership, to ment io n only o fe w aspects , have 
pl aced I ndia in a pos ition which, honest discl a imers to 
ar ea le ad ership by I nd ia n politicians nob ,i thst and in g , ls 
bound to exert it s wei ght on anything happening i n any par t 
of Sou ther n Asia . We may not accept Prof e ~sor Michs.el Brecher ' s 
judgement that her ne i gh bors are 1tby comparis on pygmie s 07 and 
vrn may not go alon g with Nehru ' s self - ev a luati on : 
One of the major qu esti ons of t he day i s the read -
justment of r el a tio ns between Asi a and Europe . When we 
talk of :sia, r emember th at In dia, not be cause of any 
ambi ti on o.f hers, but because of history , &nd be cause of 
so many ot ier things , i ne vit ably ha s to play a very i mpor-
t an t part in As ia. lind not only that; I nd ia becomes · kind 
of meet i ng ground f or vari ou s tren ds and for c es and a 
meeti ng gro und between what mi ght r oughly be called the 
East and West . 
Look c;lt the map . If you ha ve to consi der any que tion 
af'fect i n th e ' id die gast , I nd i a inevit ably comes into tl1e 
pic t u re. If y ou have to con id.er any question concerning 
Sout h- East Asia ,. you cann ot do so , i t hout Indi a . So also 
with the Far Ea st. Wh il e the Mi ddle Ea st may not be directly 
con ne cte d with South - East Asia , both ar e connected ~ith 
India. '.ven i f you thin lc in t erms of re gio na l or gan isatio ns 
i n Asia, yo u have to keep i n touch with the ot her regions . 
And .ha t ever r eg ions you have i n mind , the i mport ance of 
I nd i a cannot be i gnor ed . 8 
7. I n Sel i g S . Harris on ( ed ), In di a and tha Unit ed Sta tes( New York: 
Macmi llan Co. , 1961), p .53. 
8. Fro m speech i n the I ndian Cons tit uent Assembiy on Murch 8, 
1949 , pr int ea. i n Ja wa.harlal Neh ru, I miia ' s Foreig n Policy; 
Sel ected Spee ches , Seotember 1946- Acril , 1961 (Delh i: Pub -
licati ons Divisi on , 1961) p . 22 . 
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Let us have a look at what a British author has to 
s ay; 
The pres erv a t i ..;n of both peace and the ope n s-cci et y 
in Asia depen ds d ir ec tly 1..1pon I ndian s tc1billt y ana. gr owth . 
Bet ween Pek i ng and ankar the l a r gest ,. mo.st efficie nt, and 
mos t qui ckly depl oy abl e mi li ar: fo rc.o i s the I dian a r my, 
hich ha s i nher :1.ted the tr ad i t ion of battl e tra i ni ng , 
experience, d i s ci pli ne , and org ~nization goi ng back ov er 
the hundred years and more of it s cont inu ous est abli shmen t. 
It al re ady def ends the Hi mala yan wall agains t Chinese i nf iJ.-
trat i on . To th e •,a.st its exi --tence r ei nforces Burma and the 
small successo r states o:t I nd o-C h in a . To th 'a 161lest ; i t con -
t ri b 1tes at one r emove t o t he securi t y of t he Mid dle East. 
Tak e a1tay t h e l yn ch pin , t r nsform th E-I ndi an subcontin ent 
i n to a dozen defen c el e s s, squabblin g st u tes -- and the ~,,hole 
of the I nd i an ocean and Afr ica ' s east co atits becom.e an 
area wher e sub ver s i on and mi l itar y i nt ru si on will be impos-
s i bl e to prev ent ••• ~9 · 
Or ,. a t what an Americ an. says : 
••• I nd i a compels con si deration b ,. virt ue of size 
alone. nd yet I ndia al so sticks out a mil e f rom the res t 
o~ Asi a , Africa , an d the .Middle East in the more critic al 
sen s e that th e Mehr u gov ernment commands t he br o d n&tioa -
wide sup por t and confide n ce of t he I ndian ceop letlO 
I n f i ne , I nd i a ' s posit i 1n in tha t pa rt of t h e world 
is so ou-tst andin 0 that th i s l o g excur si on i n 19 63 cou l d be 
easil •. r du be d as a. red undan t, 1 b or ed , ac :::i.de-mic exe r cise 
vere it not due to th e fa ct th , t the Unit ed Sta t es polic y-
maker s t ende d. to act in th a t area. as if I nd i a di d no t exist, 
We will have to ret urn to t h i s aspect of the Ame~i can pol ici e s 
I 
i n Sou t h ern Asia du ring 1953 ad 1954 i n a l a ter chap t er. 
American Response t o 
Chang i ng Asi a 
For ne , r ly fiY e -years &I{te :r th e end o th e Se co nd Wor ld 
9 •. Barb a ra. 1 'ar , I nd i a and the Wes t (N·ow Yo.rlo .for t on & Co., 
1961) , p .. 22 "". 
10. Se li g S . Harr ison., op. cit. p . 2 . 
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War American ~ oli c i es i n the Pacific ·i,e r e st i.11 largel y 
Ch in ~- oriented , ~part from her demili t ar isi ng and emocra -
ti s i ng mission i n J apa ~ . 
In China, h o rnver , .a.merJ.c a t s frlen d an d w r - tim e 
all y , Chtanr✓ Kai - she _,, hav in g been rece r tly made sa f e from 
J pan and elevated to t ·· ke h i s seat wit the ·world ' s oi:her 
four most pov.·erful men in the U. ? . Security Cou L ci l, ,as 
fa c ed \'iith another ., q_uite di fferen t t yp t. of .foe; vi z ., nis 
o 'n eo_pl e •. The Communi s t M:ao Tse - t ung rode to vi. ... tory on 
t hew ve of popu &r dis con t en t. The gen er liss mo ras for ced 
to r eti re to the Tai wan island before th e ye ar 1949 was ou . 
For t he nited Sta t es it was a maj or setb - ck . The 
f,.dmin.J. - tra ti on drew the les s-on thu t unpopular re g i es co uld 
no t be sustained by milit a r y crut ches made in l-.1meric a . It 
was a recognition of th & f orce of •s i an .eople ' s i m at ie nce 
~ith the corr up t, in ef f ici ent an externally bolstered 
tot e.lit ,ri an reghnes;, and t he . s. gover nment ~.or an ephemeral 
moment of time seemed to have been . · thirJdn g of new polic ies 
in line ith tbis le so n . 
Eowever, to China ' s "fri ends " in the U. ' ' . A., Chic.n 0 1 s 
deb a cle ap e ~ red to be due to . meric an ttctomestic vi.l l a iny n,. 
nothin 0 sh ort of a cons pir a cy on the part of '' tate De--artment 
of'.fi ci als. The powerfu l Chi na obby ' s cl amor for bloo :i v.as 
t empo a.r i.1~ dimmed only by the lo 1 der b angs of t 'h~ Nor th 
Korean att a nk on South Korea in June, 1950 , culm in a ti ng i n 
Com.:nm1ist China I s o direct int~.,rvention an d the subsequent 
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mili t a1·y sta.lema te. 
C 
The McCart hy 'llitch --hunt he arin gs and the ttMacArthur ... 
was .... let- do\, .:1.91 i nquest l e d the yartia.lly pa:~alyzed. Ameri~an 
governnen t t . dr aw cer t~ in le~ s on s from t he Kore an War vhich 
sup er~e ded the Chin a lesi:.-ons and · ound th e:Lr expre ssion in 
a number of mutual defense treaties with th e countries al ong 
the trPacit'ic defen s e per ime ter". Mutual 0e ci:-rity Pr ograms 
were also initi ated . 
As a res ul+ of it s victor • i n t he 195 2 Presi dentia l 
election, the Republican Pa.rt/ wa s i naugurated i n the White 
Bouse . The Repub lic an ri ght wing had alread y s aid that the 
Truman-Ach eson lessons from Chin a were wron g . To th em, the 
lessons f rom both Ch in a c;.nd .Korea · -ere the sio ie : the L:emo-
cr atic ncont a inment 11 of Communism was ntoo passi ve and 
ti mid "; . Communism neede d t o be ttroll -.,d baek 11 na peop le 
fflib er& tedn wit h the thre a t of llmassi ve ·· nd i nstantll ret o .... 
li a.tory mi gh t of Amer ic a .Beside s., this cou ld be done 11che a.pern . 
lhe new orient a ti.on of an a lre ady -.st ab li sh e d po l i cy 
brought United Sta t es ac~io ns to bear on the entire area of 
Souther n Asia i n t~ eir fu ne ss f or th e f ir st ti me . The 
military all ian ce w·th Pakistan and the cr eat i on of the 
Sou t.rueast ~ si a. Treaty Org a.nis a tio n were the t wo most ou t -
sta r1dir Ag expr es sio n s of thi s hei gh t ened con cer n for Sout he r n 
Asia du rin g th e first t wo yea rs of t he Rei:,ub ica n dmi nis -
tr a ti on . 
In the n ext chapter we wi l attempt a~ unde r s t an di 1g 
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of the domestic cind · orld dyna mic., of the evo _vi _ng .American 
res ponse to Southe r n Asia's n eri awaken i ng . Chapters III and 
I V V'i ll exp or e th e ac:tu&l fl mte ring of thts rssp nse . TneBe 
ch apters v:1ill also 8XS.mi ne t h6 i pact of' the n ew po icies 
on their relatio n s amor - themselves. The co nclud i.nC) ch apter 
will stdte th e f i nuings and pl ace them a 0 ai n3t a resu me of 
th e mai n elem~nts i n. t he United ta,tes res ponse during the 
period surveyea . 
II. THE OLD AND THE ''NEW LOOKt1 AE'D SOUTHE·tN ASIA 
Havin g set the stage in the prec ding pages we may 
attempt an ana l y sis of the nption .... l and int ernat io nal req uire -
ments o.f the United St ates s ecuri ty goa l s and their emergin g 
emphasis on .military solutions to Sout hern Asi a 's problems. 
The ~ater i al available on this sub j ect is alr eady so 
volu mi no · s tha t a compr ehensive cov er age here would be 
i mpossi ble-. vVhat can be done in this sm·~11 s ect i on is to 
merely atte mpt an i nt erpret·ti ve summary of th e points nec es-
sary to the subsequent r eCtuir ement s . Mor eover, not all aspects 
of the new strategy were the product or. .Americ an pol ic ies in 
Southern Asi a , nor has the i mpact been conf i ned to th~t part 
of the world. Se cond ly, much of t his material is strictly not 
germane to the area of our concern~ Thi s ext,l a i ns tvhy it was 
considered necessary to deal vlfit h it a s a s epara t e u.."rit. 
It was , how ever, felt that without taking the 
int e r pl ay of Ameri ca's world commit ments and domesti c 
realities into ac cou n t, the tre atment of the subject would 
be analogo u s to tryin g to understa nd the k ic ks of · horse 
by tak i ng count and measuring their f re que n cy without 
payin g at t ent i on to the so ur ce of its fury and native 
stren gth. 
Altho ug h it wi ll be prepo st er ous to sug ge st t hat · 
Ameri c an policies i n Sout he rn Asia were at any time de ter -
mi ned by excl si ve region r.:tl :cons i derat i ons with.o u t reference 
-to their lar ger , wor ld - wide cont ex t , it does re mai n l a r ge l y 
true th ~t, as th "s ana,ysis woul d show, Southern Asia was 
the forge as well as the b'" ... t tle gr ound for th e nNew Look 11 
armru ry developed by the Eisenho er - Dulles a rtnership. 
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For~ proper understanai g of the cha nges .rough t by 
this HNew Lookn diplomacy 1we must l ook ba ck zmd briefly 
trace th e general picture of American milit a r y pos t u· e in 
Southern Asia and elsewhere at th e time -when the 11New Look" 
lense came i n to focus . 
1947 - 51 : Conta i nment in Euro-oe 
The power realities and general eirc Utt1st an c es arisj_ ng 
out of Worl d War II l a rgely domin a ted tl te Gre a t Po ver rela-
tions through 1947 . It .i s true that .f a tef-i.11 cha nges had 
already been set in motion in the inter na tio nal arena , an d 
in th e Unite a. tates policies re 'Jond.in g to them, but the 
Truman Doctrine of March , 1947 was th @ first de.finite Americ an 
response to tle rap i dly developin g chill of the col d war 
whic h unofficially ann ounce d the demise of t he Hera of good 
fe e lingsn. 
Thi s Doctrine's oper a tive for mula offeri ng unila t era l 
help to 11fr ee peoples who a.re re s isti ng a tt empt ed subjug a tion 
by arme ' minorities or by outside pressuren2wa.s i n t en tio nally 
kept vague so a s not to 1~ad to any inter re t a tion of for mal 
' entangling" under~t and 4 ngs . 
1. Norm an J. Graebner calls it 1:1n l ie u of dip lo mRcy 11, Tlle 
• New Isolationism: A Study i n Po l itics and For e i gn Pol 1c:v 
since 195 . (JJiew York: Honaid Co.,1956},title of Cha ptei · 6. 
2 . n. s . Oep:s;rtroent of State RuJ letin, March --...,, 19 47. 
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Six mon~hs l at r, th Inter - merican Treaty ot 
Rec i procal Assist ance (o r U1e Rio Tre aty ), which w .s essen -
ti:'i£lly a forma l, j in t e .- r·es i n of co t i nuing Un it ed 
States ;ood Hei ghbor Policy to wards the South American Re-
publics, was sig n .c . I t h as not been ncommonly reg arded as 
a military alli ance 1 o~ the United States3 8 It merely par -
petuateu the arl i er· defense arrangements made during the 
War and collectivized the hither to Horth Americ an appr oach 
to the hemisplier1c probl ems , expresse d i nt tially i n what 
has come to be known a the Monroe Doctrine. 
It was only with the s i gn in g of' the North .1-tla. nt ic 
Treaty in April , 1949 t hat the United States could be sa id 
to have departed from it s traditional policy of no formal , 
advance commitments f or participation in Eur ope an affairs 4 • 
Its phraselogy of "an attack on one as attack on all" boldly 
committe d t h e United Sta tes to definite a ct ion~ and 
responsibilities. 
Korean War and Conta i nment in As i a 
Till the U.S . -J ap ar. .. e se Security Tre a ty, si gne d slmul -
t&.neo s ly t1it h the Peace Tr 0 aty on e:ptember 8, 1951 11 the 
United St ates h ad no formal mi · i t,9ry commi t me:nt s in As ia: 
3. J ames E. Kin g , 11Collective Defense: The Milit a ry Co, mitmentf' , 
i n An10ld Vfo lf ers (e d .), Alli anc e Policy i n the Col War 
(Balt imore: Jo hn Hop k.ins Pr ess , 1959) , p,104. · 
4 . Pre s i de nt Truman calls i t 1rt h e f ir s t. pe a cetime mi.J.i t ... ry 
a lli ~nc e ent red into by the Unite d States since the adoption 
o: . . the Co~stit r ti :1"; ~aX:~Y_ ~ •nTr?-ma.1:, _ M~m.oir -· (~I) Ye~rs of 
'l'+J.abi~~::t HoQ:g ( Ga.r ..... en City. uoubled ay & Co.,19 55 ) , p • .-~.41 . 
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Secret a r y Acheson ' s tal of "t he Paci f ic Defense Perimet er" 
in a Pre ~s Conference on J anua ry 12, 1950 and tbe f inancin g 
of Chi ang ' s resiste n ce to Civil War in Chi na did not am~mnt 
to a cce ptanc e of formal obli ga tio ns . The Chin e se i n t erven-
tion in the Kor ean War in Nov embe.r, 1950 finally nconvinced '' 
the U.S . Admi n istr a tio n that the prospects of Mao ' s tu r n ing 
into a second Tito were wishful thinking 5and that a ne w 
Communist front had opened whi ch would l1ave t o be "co nt a in ed n. 
The Security arran ge men t with J apa n , the erst -hile ar ch - foe 
of the Un ite d St a te s was, t herefor e , th e fir t s tep in +ha t 
di rect i on . 
The Philippines , ho 'l-·ever , fa il _d to look a t th e i ssue 
i n the s •' me li ght . They wanted , i n tur n , to be secu red agains t 
a remilit arized Land of th e Risin g Sun befor e it was itself 
secured f r om the Red tide . A defense pact h ad, t here-f ore , to 
be concluded with her on August 'O , nine dar s befor e th~ 
6 . In a spee ch on J anuary 1 r·; 1950 befor e t he Na ti onal Press 
Clu b , Wash in g ton, D. C., Dean Acheson point _<i out th a t the 
Kremlin was "det a ch i ng the nor thern pr ovinc e s of China and 
• • • a tt a ch in g t hem to the Soviet Union . '.I.'his pr oces s is 
complete i n Outer ,, ongolia. It i s near l y comf)lete in M"n-
Churi a , and I am su re that in Inner } on goli a an d · i nk it mg , 
th ere are h¢tp py report.., from Soviet a.gents t o Moscow • ••• 
Thi s fact tha t th e Sov i et Union is t ak i ng the northern 
provinces of Chin £ i s th e s in gl e mos t si gnific an t , the most 
import ant fa ct, in th e relat ion of any forei gn power i n 
Asiau . The Sec r etary empha sized th at undeP no circumst an ces 
the Un it ed '' t ate s mus t " se ize th ~ unen vi · ble posit i on which 
the R ssi ns have carved ou t f or the mselv es. We must not 
deflect from t h e Russians to ours .elve s th e ri ghteous ang er , 
and the wr a th, and the ha tre d of the Chine s e, peo pl e whi ch 
must deve lop", "The Far Eas t and Sout heas t Asi a: The Bas ic 
position of the Unit ed Sta tes", print ed in Amer ic an Foreign 
Policy , 1950 - 55 , Ba sic Doc _ITJents, Departm ent of St at e Pub -




s.i gn in g of the J ap anese Tre at y . On Se pt ~.mber 1 , the United 
Sta.t es a .Lso sig ned the ANZUe' Pact wit h Au s tr a l i a and New 
Zealand , again a s · guaran tee of J ap~•ne se ?oo d behav i or . 
That compl ete& th e pict u r e of Uni ted Sta t es commit - B 
ments under the Democrati c Mmi nist r&tion . ~ ~.%td) 
Ba s ically, the Tr urr.w.n po lic y had been de i gned to ,~V-· ~ 
C...v,Jr.LJ 
meet Communi s t po s tu res a.s they de vel oped . It t ri e to ,,.,,..,,,, ~
res pond to these cha:llenge s reso l utely , bu t never by over -
sp re ad i ng the .Americ an i nvolvem en t. It extended h el p to 
lo cal go ver nments i n Gr ee ce an d Turkey t o f i ght the Communi st 
armed mi nor iti es9 The Sovi et blockade of Western a cc ess 
routes to Ber li n vrns met by a her oic and cos tl y a ir lift . The 
"'ovi e t adv ance in Eas t ern Europe c:.il ed f o r th e mass ive 
European Recov e-ry Pro gram t 11r ough which bill i ons o_: do lars 
in aid were made av a i able . The Nor th At la n tic T1"ea ty Or ga-
n is a tio n c ame i nto be i ng du e lar g-el y t o Amer ic an i ni t i ativ e 
an d supp ort. 
I n Asia, t he Americ an r e spon s e was sim il arly marked 
by cautiou s resolut io n . J:t ne ver thrf: w d i plo ma cy to t h e 
wi nds -. To the Communist v ictory i n Ch in a · i t rea c te d war ily, 
kee pi ng open th e po ssi -bil ity tha t Chi na mi ght not ca st he r 
lo t entir el y wit h th e Sovi et Uni on . The Unit ed St at es bor e 
mo st of the brunt i n oppos i ng aggr e ssio n in : orea . I t then 
tri ed to s t reng t ien th e .Paci fic defense pos it i on by maki. ng 
cl ear commi t.ments, reali st ic all / and r ec ogni si ng t h e fu tili ty 
of spread i ng the net too t hin. Th e re ~ult was ~h&t Americ a 
was not a lone i n mo s t of th e s1t u ~t i on s whe re act i on bec aqie 
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necessa ry . The ,dmi n istr a tion tri ed to or k vdth a lli e s 
an d thro · gh the Unit -ed :.Na t ions . When Mac.Arthur openly 
ai...voc a.te d extens io n of the Kore an conflict.,. P:rerid. ent Tru -
man respon ded t o t he fi'orld op i n io n and t o the re a li tie s of 
the ne ~- power- situa t ion in :Asia by relievi ng the f ive -st ar 
gene r al of' his command . 
In short , the Tr uman - Acheson pol ic y wa s geared t o 
the cone pt of lim i te ~ power. I t ~as based on t he real i za-
tio n t hat , give n. the rea liti e s of vior ld politic~ , Communi sm 
coul d at bes t be "con t ai n~ «6 bu t not "des t r oy edN i n the 
ne a r future . I t , th erefor e , tried t o r e conci.le to th :; uec es -
si t y of havi ng t o live Vii th th e menace til l the R d a_pplie 
was ripe or ro tt en en ough to fa l l of f by i tself . I n Asia , 
t he Administr a.t io n sno wed apprec i a ti on of t le f or c es of 
poli t ic al and s oci al change and di d no t at t empt to dam th em 
in mi d- stre am. F'or exam pl e , th i s was it s lesso n f r om Chiang 
••• what ·e co n cl ud e, I bel i ev e , i s t hat t here is 
a n ew da y whic h has a.awned in sia. I t i s a dc.1.y i n ~-;hic l1 
the Asia n people ar e on t ' ei r o-,m., an d know it; an d i nte nd 
t o cont i nue on their own. It i s a. day i n whic h · th e ol . 
relat i ons bet wee n east and v,·est are gone, relat io nship s 
whi ch : t their worst were e:xploit a tion :, fu"ld ·whi ch t the i r 
best er e pa t er na lism . That re l a tio n ship is ove r, an d the 
rel a tions h ip of' ea st and wes t mt:!.St now be in th e Fa r East 
one of mutual respect a.Yl.d mut ua l hel .pfulne s s. e are th eir 
friends . Ot her s are t he ir fri end s . We and those oth ers are 
wi llin g to hel p , but we can help only v,here we a.re :anted 
and only he r e. t he con.di tion s of help are re al l y sensible 
and poss ible. So what we can se e i s th at t h.is new day in 
.Asi a, th is ne•; d ay , ·h ic h i s dawn i n g , ma.y go on to a g lo -
rious oon or i t may drizzl e out . But that decisi on li es 
6 . n1ong - ter , pa ti en t , bu t f irm a.nd v i :ri l .ant conta inm ent 11 
Y3~pa~U~f11tt sd P8~i~ , Opif~nK1ni eij~,ir 'f~e n he was the State 
·i thin 1t:kt.km the countri es of As i a and withi n the 
pov"er of th e Asi an · pe opl e . It i s no t a de c is ion 1 ·h ich 
a friend or even an enemy f ·ro m outside can decide fo r 
them. 7 
Again, presenting th e i !-"'c.ul l952 Mutual Secur it y 
Pro a-ram , D n Acheso n stated that "poverty, disea..,e , illit e-
r a cy and rese n tments ag · in s t f o r mer- colo ni a l exploi t c tions 
are our enemi es " in what he ter med as the nv1tal crescen t ' 
from Afg l nistd.n ... o J apan , 11'1'he se represen t tur bu l en t f orc es 11, 
he em ha.sized an ~ a ded : H ••• v:e must a ssure th a t the fo r ces 
of n ationa.l i sm ciU of the dri ve 1:or economic impro vement ar e 
ass o ciated with the rest of the f ree \' Orld instead of with 
communi sm. • ... [Our pro g r a.mj is des i gned to • . • encourage 
the growth and survival of non -Co mmunist poli tic ,· .. 1 i nstitu -
tions dedic at ed to the honest fulfilmen t of their basic need s 
and asp i ra. t i onsn . 8 
Thu s , sens in g the momentous changes th· ~t ere oc c 1 rr i ng 
in Asia , the Truman - Acheson policy correctly decided to 
absta i n :rrom i nterferi ng or b amboozli ng these countrie i nto 
l i ne with its own Weltpolitik. 
Up to th e end of 19 49 the D mocratic for ei gn policies 
wor ked v ell and , i th fe exceptions , enjoye d overwhe.1.min g 
public su ppor t . the Truman Doctri .ne , Marshall 
Plan , NATO, an d the Ber in Q.ir i ft had al l succeeded i n 
co nsoli ds,tin g t he V. es tern position. There we re signs, i n t e.et , 
B. Mutual Securi t y Act of 19 51 , Sen&te Hear i ngs, (Was hin gton: 
G. P .O., 1951 ), __R. 5 . 
7. Dean Acheso n, ~-carx~~~)S)i~~~:ltJI~, op . cit., p . 23~2 . 
11 Th e Far East . • . 11 , 
th.at the rap i d r ecov er y of stren gt h by Wes t .Europe was 
ar ous i ng the envy of its eastern ne i ghb ors . I n Americ a , the 
acut e commodit y short ages resultin 0 f r om the War h '·d eas ed; the 
em_c-loyment situation was j_mpr ovin g; and , _pric es , after a 
s~ iralli ng inflation , w-er~ s t abi i2 ,in g . The nation vas f as t 
develop i ng a gener a l opt i mistic mood and peopl.e tende d t o 
forget the emot ion al and e conomic pr iv a tions suf . fered because 
of the rec ent War~ 
This happy st a t e of tiffair s, howe ver , pro ved ~o 1)e 
-0nly th e lull before a stor m. 1 1th Chian g Kai - she k 1 s ret r ea t 
to Ta i wan i n December , 1949 before pummelli ng Communist 
sol diers , t he situat i on i n Asia fat a cquir ed omin ous hu es ,. 
I n th e i ntroductory ch a pter we not ed the sp ecially paterna -
li st ic fe el in gs to wards China tha t had of j pre existed in 
Ameri ca . 9 The substitution of :a o f or Chi ang t u rning China 
fro m a ward to a f oe had , therefore , the irony of a Greek 
tra ged y. The memor i e s of the sa c fifi c.es suffe red not l onl 
ag o i n subd u Lag a rapac io us Ni pp on f or the 5ak e of Chi ~m~ 
started coming al iv e aga i n . Thi s as the be gi nnin g oi' a 
g reat upsur ge of fr us tr a tio n an d disill usiomnent th ;:.t star ted 
snowballin g i n to a part is an - le d sea.r ch f or scapegoats f or 
9 . Ameri c an motives rega rd i ng Asia have be en complex :n Americans 
seemed far le s s afraid of ent ang leme nt s in the Ori ent . Here 
we coul d sp re ad the Go s-el , ex t end tr ade , urge reform , and 
dif fuse Amer ic ;-,n ide as Vii t h ou t danger of 1,mmedi a te political 
i nvolvem en tn, Sel i g Adler, The I sol &tionist Im ul s e: Its 
'l ,en t i et h Century Re action New Yor k : Colli e rs Books -- pape r -
b· ck ed iti o n --, 196 1) pp . ' '4 - E5 . 
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t h is Tl.American los s 11• The un cov erin g o f some Communists 
thr ough the McCar thy crusade lea di ng to Cong r essiona l 
lbl.earings a a i nst State Department of f ici a ls an d the I n sti t1_1te 
of .Paci fi c Relations set t he publi c mood i nt o a f u se hhich 
was · po ,,erfully ei:.on.a.te d by the Korean War .. Ameri can s had to 
·bear the ma j or bur den c,f th at VEar and suffere d tre mend ous 
lo sse s i n men and mate r i als . But , whe,. Trum an restr a in ed 
MacArthur' s ma r ch i nt o 'ian churia an d l a t e r reli eved. the 
,Gener 1 of his coreri.1a.nd , ho::> pla y ed s t rai ght into th h a n ds 
f the G. O. P . Fi rst of 411 ., people cou l d not unde '.".'Stand why 
it became nece s sary to fj_gh t an other wa r s o soo n aft er the 
l a~ t War an d for a coun ry whos e ·name ~.m. mo s t of th em ha d 
even 
no1/ he•rd be f ore . They could apprec i a te even less the bogg in g 
the 
down o f/ Ameri can soldie rs i ndefin i tely a t the ima gi n ? ry 38th 
.~again st 
parallel in a mili t a ry st aleme ... e . It went so much / th e gra j_n 
of American mi l i t a ry t radi ion of figh t 1:n.g occasion·l wars 
hero ic a ll y · nd then s_peedi ly r eturnh2g home to norma l 
voc at io ns . 
The su cc ess of the her o ' s welcome to Mac.Art-1:mr ano. 
t h e l a ter Congressional Hearin gs of hi s case did enough to 
arouse public emotions ag. i.ns t t he Democrati c A -.ministrat i on 
for its alle ged f~ilures i n Asia . The ri ght win g ~it in th e , 
Republic an Party , which concl 1 dPd that t h is popular ent hu sia sm 
.g,a.ve them a mandate fo r th "'ir Ast a- fir.st qrie:nt .;,.t:ton , a cquire d 
ascen ..... a ncy . The mass hys t eria .:md -Prustrati on.s whipped up 
by the wild charges of 110.f Pici al defeatism a.nd dea f nes s 
t o vvar d As i a which exte. de d f ro m th'"' ;;reside ~cy do \r,.l.1110 
cha nged t he nat i on • s f or e i gn - oli cy mood rathe r ·ap i dl y , 
maki ng i t µcss i b l e or t he Repub lic an s t o turn tha t po li cy 
i n t o a domes t i c s t r ugg l e for po~er . Th e Pr e sidential el e ct i on 
year of 19 52 of fered too ti mel y a1 oppor ~n i t y to be nis se d . 
Th .. e Repu bli cans i n ve igh aG. t b a.t ever y v:ou n.d to 
Americ a ' s i n t e r nat i onal po s it i on s i n c e Nor ld 'f/✓ar II v:a s , in 
effe ct, s elf - i nfl ict ed . The Rus s·a.n adv a n c e i nto East European 
countr i es · s r c t the result of a _ ewer - va cuum, but of ··oose -
v el t - Tr umf:in 11t r ag ic bl unde rs 11 a t Teher a n , Ya lt a , and Pots./la m 
and "ot hers to f ol l o·w 1 • . non ou r P a ci f ic flank n , the Repub -
l ic an pl at form char ged , · the Tru man - ' ch eson °vil la i ny n had 
nsubst it u t ed a mur der ous en emy f o r an all y and fri ndll . T11e 
Admi nis rat i on had f i rs t 11i nvit ed 11 th e Kor e an V-:ar, "i nvoke d 
t he pat r io tic and s acrifi ci a l. supp ort o f th e mer i cctn peop le 11, 
an ·,, then , it di d not h a v e 11th e Till t o victo ry tt •11 The 
pl a t f o r c as t ig · t ed th Tru man" u ro pe Fi rs t" ori en t a ti on 
and a t tr i bu t ed Amer ic a ' s Fa r East er n nr a il u r es 11 to t h e 
Admi n i s tr at i on ' s n s i a l :as tH pol ic y 11, hen the Sovi et Un ior i 
had turned t o an HAsi a f i rs t 11 polic y . I n sh ort, Amer ic an 
pol ic y h ad beco me nsh or t on i deas , sho rt on und ers t '-'n~in g of 
10 . Thi s i s an a cc u r a t e summat i on of the Republi c an char g es 
one by a Re~ub lic an suppor t er maga zi ne , f iv e year s lat er: 
Life , 11Tr u.11im, Chi na. a n d Hi s tor y" ( e dit or i a l), X1 , J an . 23 , 
195 6, p . 4 0. 
11. "R e p b lic an Pl a t fo r m o f 1,.,52 11, repr o d.L ced i n Cu r r en t Hi sto ry 
XXII , Oc t ober , l ;15'", pp . 24 6- 54 . 
the n at u re and methods of th e Eh ... emy , short 011 fighting wi l l 
Mr. D ll e.s became t he chie.f f or ei gn pol i cy expert an d 
.,pok e !;:lm&.n of t he Re publ ic &.n Par t y as ·e l l as later nt-he bes t 
Se cr e t ary of St a t e n Pr .es i dcnt EL,enhowev h a d nev e r kn ownt 1 • 
Re i s s a i d t o h av e rtb e ;- t- a rtic ul a t ed th e th i nk i n g of · 1 1 th ~ 
~r ch it e cts of t h e n at i on a l defense poli c1a s "13 of his eri od . 
I n hi s a rticle titl ed n.A Polic •·, of Bol dness n i n the 
f:!i f ~ i ssu e of May 19, 19 52,14 Mr • .Dul le s chara ct er i ze d the 
pol ic y of cont a i nment as "n e ga tiv e , futil e , and i rmnoraP 1 • :\Je 
a re not worki ng , sacr ifici ng , and spend i n p- i n or der t o be 
a ble to live -wi t ho · t t h is p"".r il -- bu t t o be ab l e t o li ve wi t}; 
it, pr e sumab ly .fo r ever". 'Th e Tr uman - Ac-he s on po lic i es we:ce 
"tr eadmill polici es , \~h ic h , a t be st mi g_h t p er hap s [sic] k e ep 
us i r t he s c~me pl a ce unti l we dro p exha u s t ed 11• They wer e Hnot 
de si gr ed to 11' i n a war co n c l . si vel y 11• He ac cused .t ha t 1111,e no w 
spons or t he Iro n Curt a i n to cut of i' our a tt r a c t i ng power ; and 
t hu s v.e he .lp to g ive de s poti sm a l ease on li .fe ". Tl Th er e is 
on e sol u t i on and onl y on e 11, he ~ onti f ic ed , llth a t • p l S .1.0r t he 
fre e world to de velo p t he will t o or gan i ze the means t o 
r e t al i a t e i n s+ an tly aga i1,1s t open agg r es.., i on by Red arm i es , 
s o t hat i f it oc cu rr ed any v:-here , we cou l d ari d vtou l d str i ke 
l ': . 'Zil li am L enry C11amber i n , Beyond Con t --i nment ( Chic ago : 
Hene r y Re ne r y Co.t l95 3), p . 83 
1 3 . J ames · i ng , op. c i t ., i? . • 1 8 - 2 1. 
14 . XXXVI, P~ . 146 ff . 
ba ck wher e it hurts , by me,.ms of oLir v,·. choosin g 11• 
Con c ern i ng th e t.captive pe ople II und er the 11Godles s 
Communism.IT, Mr . Dull es wrote th at tr rn n i ted St a tes '' should 
m· k e i t , ub licl y kno wn th~t it wan t s and ex oe 0 ts [it2-ics 
ad ded] li b e r a t i on 1..0 occur n . ""'he me re s t a t eme-:1t o f +hG. t , i :h 
and exp et a i on , he lf<e 1t on , "v,ould cha .ng;e , i n un e lect r i .-
fying way , t h e noo of the c .,._, t i ve ~ -oples .. It v,ou l d pro ba.b l 
,.~ut hea vy new burd en~~ on t h e j a ilers an ·_ c reate ne' op por t.u-
nitie ~or liber a t i on° . 
11 
-ever had the ill us i on of i 1eric n oam::~ otence 
em'ande so much of Amer .le n i p ·.omacyH • 1 5 111'he Repu b lica r1 
pro gram of acti on" , P_ofe s so r Jo hn W. Spani er comment s , 
, l , apparentl ? en visa ge d · he f uture See:ret ar: of St a t e , 
J ohn ' J oshuat Dulles, m~r ch in g ar ound the wal ls o the 
Kremli n empire , sound i ng th e call of' freedom u µon h i s 
tr u pe t . h e wa ll s '."iOUl d th 0 n come t umbli ng 6.o v,.m., t he 
en sl aved pe opl e wou d b li ber · ted , &nd Soviet po~er 
wou l d be f or ced to retreat . 16 
Mr . Dulles , not on ly prom i sed t o "strike ba c n and 
11li bere. t e 11, but to 10 so a t ncut - ra t en rice , I n the Lif e 
a r t ic le , qu ot ed abo ve, JtJr . Dulles h a d sai ei .th a t ➔ · he ne11; 
polic y ' s corn erston · ,ou l d b e na bal anc ed b1 d6 et , a r e,..,uced 
n a t i ona l deb t, an economi c a l admiiu.str a ti on, a.,1d a cu t i n 
t axes 11 • 
He amplifi ed his i de as l a ter in an ad dress to th-e 
Council n Fore i gn · .ela t ions on J anu a r y 1 2 , 1954 : 
15. Graebn er , op ~ cit , p . 
16 . Amer ic an .F'o rei crn .1. olicy since World 1:,1a.r I I ( New York: 
Frederick A. Praeg e r , 196 ) , p . 101. 
~e nee ' a llie~ ad col ecti ve 0 e curit y . Our purp o se 
i s to ma e the "'e rel at i ons ef ective , l ess costly . This 
can be don_ by pl ~cin g mor e reli a 1ce on de t errent po~e r 
and le Es d .pend en ce on loc 1 de:t ensi ve po·~·er . 
Thi s is a cc epted pr:::ctic so far as loc al commu. iti e 
are con cerned . W Keep loc · on our doors , bu~ ? e do nu~ 
ha v an rned _uard i n ever home . We reJly pr incipal y 
on a c om11ur-l ty se c'1.ri ty system so well ee: 1 i pped to pu -i .:.sh 
any v·ho breaK in and s t eal that , i n fact , ·m··:il ci- be a res -
sors ar e genera ly deterred . That is the modern wuy of 
ge t t i ng maximum s ecurity a t a bear· · ble co ..:.,t  
\ihat the Ei senho vver administr t i on see · .s i s a simi..L r 
int e rn at i onal securi t y system . We want , for ours lves and 
the ot her free n at i ons , a ma_ imuro de t errent a t a bearabl e 
cost . 17 (i talics added ). 
Then he wrote an &rti cle i n 1xl:mc ·or e i gn ;, ff airs v.to ~ e 
general them e i:.as also e co nomic. ll' ie do ;.1.ot n-..ed elf - i mposed 
po licies tha t sa ... our trengthri , he v,r ot e an d 'dded : 11By .l Ov'J, 
howe v er , the new course i s charted and i s guio i n g our· mili -
t ary plann i ng . As a result , it i s now p o sible to ge t , an d 
share , more ba:3 i c securi ty a t less co s t 11. l 8 
There i s an othe r s id 0 of t.he 11New Look 1 thin k·· ng v.h i ch 
co ..t.Cerns So'..lthe r n Asi a more d · rec t ly and T1hich a) e ars to 
ha ve been at thu back of Mr . Dulles ' mind all t he t ime . 
We have a lr eady referred to the Repu lic an crusaue , 
~ la C.lina Lobby , ag a i nst the Tr-uma..Yi- Acheson 11sub stit J.ting 11 
.. i h ' I h Li-f" · 1 1 9 of Mao Tse - tu.ng for Ch i ang Ka - st en:. n t ... e~ arti c e ; 
17 . n- vo~ t i on o~ Foreig1 Po licy" , Departme nt of St a t e 
Bu letin , J anuary f.5, 195 4 , pp . 107- 10 . 
8 . J ohn Fost er Dulles , ?:Policy for Pee..ce .,;n Sec urlty 11; 
Forei 0 n Affa irs. , XXXII , April , 1954 , h . 35~ - 69 . 
1 9 . 11,f ~olicy of ol une s", J._oc. _s-i ~ . 
Mr . Dulle s had p rescri bed tnat i n A~i a "a more of a hope~ul , 
s :>irite d , dyn.s.mism coul d r i 0 ht th e ba lan c en . I n the Cou ci l 
on Fore i gn Rel ati ons address , he liste~ n_ome tra nsforma~ i ons " 
whic h , on app lic a ~i on o f vne ttNew Lo ok ' t 0 st the Ei senh o v,,er , 
admi n i s tr at io n h ad fe J.t wer e need ed . The f i rst of th e se t ran ~-, 
f orma tions he mention ed ¼as : 0 It i s not sound milit nr st ra t egy 
pern1c nen tly t o cornmi t O ni t ed St a t es l a n d forces to 1-1.si a to a 
de gree t ha t leaves us no strate~ ic rBse rve s" . 
That his n ew str a te gy was ha tche d i n t h e AsiEn eg g-
basket fotmd con . 'ir ma t i o in fir . Dul le s ' Forei gn Aff9, irs 
art. ic le . Ra v.i ng s a i d i n a. pr ec ed i ng para graph that 11Vlest 
Earo pean countries •.• ca cr ea t e defense of he Co tinent" , 
he arned : " dost area s ~i tb i n the r each of an agg r essor o. fe r 
l e s s vaL;ie to hi m th an the los he :oul d suffe r f ro :n w'"'ll -
co nc ei ve d retal ia tory measur esf 1 • Pu t this a_gb.inst his fol ovd .g 
clarifi ca t i on of t he lluet erij_nCe of mass iv e r e t al i a to ry po e r " 
i n t he s·m e arti cle: 
The e s sen tial t h i ng i s t hat a po t en ti al agg r es ·or 
sho '.l d kno w i n advance that he c an and will b e mate to 
suffer for h i s agg r ess i on f G-r more th an h e possib l y can 
g: i n by it . '1:his call s f cir a ·y ' t em 1 ~-:hich lo cul d~fen -
s i ve s tr e1g th i s - r ei nfor c€d by more mobile det e rr en t µo~e r . 
The met hod of doin so v, · 11 v0..ry a cc ord i ng 1:0 the chare..c t er 
of the v~r io us are- s . 
I n fa ct the-e t h r ee i "eas of , ( 1) more punishment for 
les s ga i n , ( t ) ~; s t e r r: E rope ' s ability tor Continent al .e.f ense , 
and , ( -z) , the nareas ;,ithin +he reach o f (:.'.n aggressor 11 occ ur 
i n th at order i n t hree consecut i v e paragraph s in t he art~ c1 2 . 
Be si c es , as J · mes _-i ng poi nts o t , th,., t heory of 
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nu clear de t erre nce rece_;__ veci Hi ts fl r st sy-te m.atic st a t e.mEnt" 
and bec ame a 11doctrine 11 of massive retaliation ni n rel et.tio.n 
, 0 to t h In.do - Cb in~ crises of 1 9 5,,:_ ,.:,4n . ;::; '.ii e wi ll h " v ~ op pe r -
tu n ity o refer to this L1 the n e t chapter . ) 
That ther e h a s a l w ys bee n a stron g ex pan s i oni + 
f eel i n g t ov·ard s Asia , esp e cl~lly C i na , a.men ; c ert s.in s 1;;:c · ions 
in th e Unite d 2t a t e s ·· a disc ss ed earlier . ,lfter 'th e d ebacle 
of th. ~t " r ag ic hero of histor 1 ' s Awi a n tc'i.le 11f ~ he HAs ia 
F•i rs te1· ~ t ti fr ,., s tr a i on fo nd n ew ze a l in t h e 1N'0w Loo kn of 
the new Admini st ra ti - n. 
Ma cAr t h r is re orte d to have tol d Re_re se nt al i ve 
Jo r:}?ph '~) .• Aartin , J r . = nr"' ,e lo s e the v,·a r to Cocrr.nunis !n i n 
A i a , he f a l of •'1 ro e is in evit ab le; Viin it <:<t,.d E1 •ro Je 
most pr obab y ~ould av oi d war and yet pre serve freed om11.2~ 
I n thus advoc ';; ti n 6 · r i mo.cy to Asia in the Unit ed S-c.:: t t- ;: 
fore i gn pol ~cy , ener al Dougl as MacArt ~ r cer t ai nl y had 
company , both amon g th e dea . an d th e th en l :L vin g : Theo dor e 
oo seve lt, :1.ltred Th a · er Vtc1.h an , th e Cc...bot Lod rtes , Herber t 
Hoov er , Rober t A. Taft , Jos_ h McCar t hy , Willi ::.m Knowl and , 
an d the new comer , J Q.rm F'o::, ter D.1.lles . 
The reasoning of th e mi - t ntntieth cen1.,u ry 
'!Asial a t ionis ts n h s been Y\,ell sum.med. u._p by S eli g r dl ·er : 
2 0 . op . cit, ) . 119 
f; • P rase used by editor s of - ~fe, editorial , loc. G,it ._ 
. ~S . CJuoted in Char l es 1'1. 1 :ill ou h by and J o hn Ch amberlin , 
Jj/ a.c rt hur) 19_1J:- 5l, vol . II 1~ew York : icGr a w Hi ll Book 
Co. , 195 4 , pp . ~l - 42 ' . 
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This con:'ident moo d prev a iled in 1951 , b ec ause our 
pr o s;)er i t y vli.s o ver lo i~in g , our con omy oo ing , Yid our 
arme forces were bac;:ced potential y by;:,. stoc kp ile of 
A- bombs . I n Asia we ou .ld flex our m scl 0 s ._,,itho·: .1t he l '.) 
or aa vic~ f rom poverty - stricken allies, for there our· 
le ad ershi. could not b e ch ·- le n ged (in the n ar fu t ure ) 
by any non - Communist pov.er f.i ll i ng to o ou r '-f.ay . If, on 
the o her hand. , v~e continue " to place the defense of 
Europe ah ad of victor y in Asi a , ,·.-e .""o t1l d till c•e p a_,u ed 
Y,ith al lie ' who vwuld insist u_pon mut ual conc: u lta t i on and 
action in the campaign ag ai nst i,;om.:rm:mism. Sena tor : enneth 
C. 'ihe r y bes(; ex1-;res se d thi feelin g of n a tion· 1 supe r iority 
wren he s aid i n 19 40 : 1 Wi th God I s hel p , we will lift uhaL -
gha i up and up , u.ntil it i s j us t li ke Ka nsas City 1 . 23 
.to restate the foundati ons of the strategy of t he 
1 . From the premise th · t the Tru man - Acheson - 1{e rma.n 
ncontairnner.t" ol ic y was too 11neg ati ve , futile, and immoral tr 
':1: d v,ras a im ed a t sta gna ting the United St a t e s int o u11 vi ng 
,,d h the peril f or eve r 11 the 11:.ev, Look" reached. the conclusion 
that Commm.i m should be 11destroyeu 1 a nd not Hco!'ltained 11 and 
the Hci.t:Jt i ve peoples li bera te dn t h r ou gh a. PPolic y of Boldness 11• 
2 . America ' s stren g t l ·was be in g n...,app ed " throu 0 h 
defense expend i t res ~he£ it ~a s possible to acnieve ~more 
secur it y at l ess costn , i.e . , by 11att a ching a pri ce t ag to 
securi tyn. :24 
3 . '·he Republican victory had been ... os s ib · e l a rgi:>ly 
due to the mass hvs t eria. 
" 
and fr' s tr a ·ion c aused by the 
tiasia Fi rsters 11 and China Lo by ists over the "betray ,JJ_ '1 of 
C 1i¾ whi ch had 11d ir e ctJ.y led" to the Hseez:;ii n g ly endless 
24 . 1:-la.nson W. Ba.Jd, i n i n ~hSLNew York Times , J ~n a l'y ,-A,; .1954 . 
1-Cor"-an War 11 wi t h its II tr a 5ic t oll H of ~meric a'l lif e . ·_he ir-
:poi nt o f v i ew v as, therefore , a cc ep t ed that since i10 . d. 
Europett r;•,a capab l e of tc..Ki ng c:.:.re of it se l '"', s ia no,>.. must 
be made safe : ram t he Red tide . 
4 . I n t e r ms of tbe int er -n~tiona.l i t J.at i on -- supp J.e-
ment i ng the Uni t ed States domes1.,ic po itics -- th e most 
si gn i fi c ~mt f · ct was that :::inc e Rea cr~i. a ( 11g lutt ed ·,, it h 
) . ~ man1~0 ·er 11 had no ·c apaci t y t o h it b a ck · <-l! the only ;ay to 
recon cil e all the bove irreconcil ables. v~as ... o conce n t r a te 
on nrol l i ng ba ck" the Red tide i n A ia . 
Chal l en~e and Response 
th. ncom un i t . e ril H at a re· uced r a te 8. -; hf= t herci _ y f or 
res,scitati ng t he sagging popul ar mor a le , th e Repub ica n 
dtni n istrati on had n oVJ to face t h e ac i d test of pr o v i ng its 
ef f ic a cy and yet f ace t he real it ie of i - c .ntury i nte r -
natio na l rel tion~ . 
Var i n :~ o r ea nad been t e_ · z·e y ik ;...,· e s of the ele cti on c ampa i gn . 
• 1r . Ei senhov- , er had a id th a t h~ \~,ou ld II for go t e di v ers i.ons 
of politics . . • to con c en t ra t e on t he j ob of en~i ng 'he 
... ore an Wa.r • •.• Tha t j ob 11, he h a d asserted , "re q1 i r ed d. 
~5 . Eve n t ho gh Gh i na ~a s a lli ed ¼it h Ru s ~ia , t1v . at te r 
hersel.f v,a ~ hehiai the United S t a tes in the develo pment 
of nuclear _ sto c~ p il es . She had , ho1~0e v er , G.lre ady ex plode· 
th e kir s t a~om b om i n 194 9 a nd the consi d er at i on thn t 
Lmeric an uperior · y mi ght not l as t foreve r must ha v e & •. s o 
a "bol d n pol i cy formul at ion , whil e the Uni tec'. St a tes 
a lone bas te d i n the at omi c suns nine . 
e r son1: l tr i p . • . . "6 shall go to .-orea. 11. K: Acco rd i ng 1 y 1 
i n the company of Mr . Dull es he went to Korea shortly afte r 
ii s elect i on . On the r e turn voyage abroad the Hele 1a, 
r . Du~·es d i s closed to James he ple y of 1ife~ 7 durin g tre 
1956 Pre s i ent i al el ect i on year , they made khis decis i on:If 
the Chinese RLds did not agree to honor a ble truce" I";i thi.c1 
reason: ble t ime uhe Un ite d St ates v:ould ren ew th e f i ght i ng 
and th is time "f i ght to wi na . This would re quir e a ir a ~t~ ck 
i n to Manchur ia which the Tr an admi nis t r 1::rt i on had 11protected 11 
by it s de ci sio1 not to c ross t he Yalu rive r "eve n by a i r" . 
11Fur t he r more n, to sa ve l i ves , nEi senho wev er Ctecided on the 
t a ctical u se of ato mic ar ms " . Th ey de c ide o. to conve y to tn.e 
Chinese the g i s t of vQha t these new decis io ns meant . 
Mr . Ei senhowe v er used the S t a te of the Union message 
to announce th at he had rescinded the Truman or de r i n terl op i ng 
t he 7t h Fleet between Chi ang an d fao . Mao wou ld. no l on er be 
s a ved . 'li1r. Dulles further co nfided to the Li fe co rres1Jcn den t 
that he h i mse l f , on his f ir s t goodw ill tour to se v eral ifl·orld 
c ap it a ls , tol d Mr . Nehr u i n Delh i t h a t the United St a tes v,oul d 
Hli ft t he self - imp osed restrict.ions on it s a cti ons and hoL .. 
back no v,.;ea on or eff ort t o .: inn . To make the po i nt , the 
Shep ley i nt e rv i e1i: i nforms us th a t HDu_lles had conf _. dence i n 
Nehru ' s a.bi i ty to c ommunic a.te soeed j_ly wi th Pekingn . 
~6 . Quoted i n Graebner , op . cit ., p . 101 . 
27 . J ames Shepley , HEfow Dul.les Averted Warn (nThre e Times ~t 
Br i nk o f 'Ja r : B.ov, Dulles Ga., bled and Vfonn , tit le pa g e c.,.p -
tio n ) , Lile , XL, J · nu a ry 16 ,. 1956 , p p . 70- 8 • 
er e , Li fe ut s life i nto the dram& . a f o 1 c l oc k i n 
t he morni ng of J une 18 , 1953 Mr . D'• l le s :ms ct•:,aker.~d by the 
co nsts.nt uproar of th e t e le •. hon ... .:n i ~ b ed r oom. I t > s t he 
,at chdog of f i cer 1:::.t the dt :~te I epartme t vho :1·d recr..'\i ved 
an urger: t ra di o message from Korea , across the dc.r k l?.sc ific . 
Syngman Rhee had "un le ~ s h12d r1 the _prisoner3 of v?ar . WDulles 
i s ened qu i etl , g r unt i ng an occ as i ona l 1yow 1 to a cknowl edg e . 
Then he rea-hed ov er to s~itc h on the l i gh t . And at that 
momen t , · s ... d s f u ly arous _ ·- o i nd shooK oL the fo 5 of 
s l ee _, D 1.ll es a ,, h i m.se lf and the nat io n -·tanaing on t h e 
brin -';: of Zs new 'irar". 'lel ephone from ''l le s to is enh ower . 
ttDu. es found the Presi d nt calm &nd r eady . The Be .c:,na 
de ci s i on was re a ffirm ed . The Manchuri~n tar?et ~ had alre ady 
be en caref ul l y s elecved • •• n 
Bu t the Red.::3 ch 1c .trene d ou t. 11They co nt in u ed t.o n e ; o-
tiat e , t hu s a cce pt i ng a prop~gand~ de f ea t ••. They di d so , 
Dulles be i ev es , b ~caus e t hey ha d ha' urn:ni staka.b l e ,-a r n in g 
th a t f·rther · e ays v,o uld no l onger be met · i th U. S. 
i nde ci s i on ". 
"Th irt y - nine day~ l ate r the t r u c e was s i gn ed" . 
Could the r e have be en greater tr i umph f o r the 
The i nterpretati on that ·,h e t hr e a t did de t er th, 
re•s has been acce pted b most of the Am-ri c½n \ri t 0rs I 
have ho. a ch an ce to rer:>.d, ven by authors ' ·8 who ,-r e 
!.8 . c f . Grae bne r, oo . ci . , . . · 5[ - 5 ; p.s.ni er , c_o. cit , 
PF•l 04- 6; and rtoscoe Dr mho ,d B.nQ Gaston Cobl e11t , -1uel 
a t the Brink ( G,,.r ' en ·1ty : Dou. l eday & Co ., 960 ), ,.,p. l_ l - l ,..,,. 
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o ther wis e criti c a l of the ttj ew Loo -;:11 bragga do cio . 
But here are some f dcts ~hi c h o not corrobo r ate 
Mr . Dulles ' versbn i n the Li fe int erv ie . : 
1 . Mr. Neh r is reported to have den ied r . ·ulles ' 
sug 0 est i on that th e I ndian Prime ML .ister conveyed the 
n o. 
at omic att- ~ th reat to Pei g . ~~ 
;:-.:: .  Si r ·n thon y Eden i n hie; Memoi · s ha th.i .s · o say : 
mhe r elease of pri~oners 
was~ righ t and a left f o r President Rhee . Ari h t 
at the Com 1uni sts '-'ho 1r ere alar ed and indi gnant a t so 
s e ct ac ul ar a .: esert i on ; a left at the Americans ~Aho 
ere nomin ally i n charge of the camps and correspon ~i ~glr 
eml;)arrassed i n th negoti9.t i ons . 30 
3 . ir . ulles issued th e f ollo wi ng statem ent on 
J une l , th e same day that :he rece .i ved t 1e m8rning call: 
I ha v e been i n co nference wit h the President . . • 
Th i s ac ti on [Rhee ' s relea i 1g the 1Jri onersJ :a in 
v i ol tion of the authority o,i,, the United. 11 , • i ons ComLan d 
• • • We have a ct ,d an are ctin g i n 6ooci f cti th . re:d - ':i'_ 
de:1t i s cornmunic · tin g v .. ith Pr e sicient Rhee in th i s sense . <)1 
4 . [r . Y.·al te r S . Robertson , Assis t a t Secre t ary of 
Sta t e for F&r Eas ter n Aff .i rs ., ; s inr, ediatel. r · is po.tched to 
t ..._~l K to Rhee i n .t(orea and bring I inst c1nt ' . re ss;.1re to b &r 
on him . Af t er t wo .eeks of tal~s · hee "b ave i n , promisin g 
i n writing that he woul kee his forces ndsr th e U. N. 
Cornman ' • 3 ;:::. 
~9 . Rich·.rd oo l d- Adams , J ohn Fos t er Dulles : A Reappraisa l 
.,;e · v · ·· f"'l" 7 t n Ce t Cr r"ts l ,..,. 'i ..... c5 i w .... or • • 1-l.y1,,..t.e o - n ry - o , ..-:.,o.:::-1 , .i:-'• ._, • 
3 . F 11 Circle (u o sto:n : Houghton Liffli n Co ., 1960) , ~ • r._9. 
31 . Robert J . on o an , .Ei sen.ho ver , the I ns ide '~tory (Nev-
York : Harper & Bros ., 19 56 ) p . 1~4 . 
32 . The New York Ti mes , June 19 , 1953 
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b . Mr . r onovs.n reports tb a t the !t ,he e et t C:-r s br---:.,ight 
0 reat r e li ef to Ei senhow r 11• 3 11The ~ti:1bb orn Sou t h Kor ean 
Pre <>i d.en·t ha~ t he United St ::it es of Amer ic ' i n a pa i n full y 
cielic a t e pr ed ic ament acid one t ha t ca used Ei seri.J101-1 e r g reat 
•vorry n . 34. 
6 . The fin a l se t tl ement di d. no t 11un ify 11 Kore a , and 
di d not se c-µre 11 li be:r ·- ti ::,n 11 of th e 11 c apt ive · eop l es u from 
Co munis t bon ag e . The priso ners ' re pa tri a tion quest .ion 1as 
s olved by a compr omi s e formul a., the United St a.te · mak in 6 equ P:.1 
conce ss io n s. 
7 . La s+l y , one 1 ~ ntitl e d to wonde r ~ha t ~& the 
pu rpose of ltr . Ei.s en hO'l":ever ' e e l ec ti on. promi.se to vis · t 
~ orea , if not- to tone doir.n Syng mo.n Rhee . Emme t Jo hn .augh es , 
who •. a-- Ei s nho .-er 1 s spee ch- wri ter, s a· s i n h is r e ce .x..t 
a cco unt of' Ei senhowe r ' Whit e Hot1"'e y aa rs th a t no decisions 
~e r e t ak en abro ad th e H len a . ~5 
The co cl us ion 110 d ap pe ar to be that i n the irs t 
enco' ' n t er be t ,;,e en Hrollb a ck n a nd th e v\.orl d pov er r e li +-ie s 
11rollb c ,1 i re t 1 r ned home t o t:con t a irun ent H_, ex pos i ng the 
Du.lle s n~oldtt t a lk -h a t h e co uld not a cc ept a l ore an 
Se ttl ement unt i l th e Unit ed t .:. t e s h a d g ive n the Ch ine s e 
"on e he l of 11 k i nt "• 36 
illl , loc . cit . 
The Ord~: l of - O\<,er: A Poli t ic ' l • emoi r of the gi senhov 1e r 
Yeo.rs ( e-;;,, York: Ath eneum , 1963 ), qu oted i n 11Witn es~, i.n 
the Hous eu , Sa t u r day Review , March 16 , 1963 , ) • 85 . 
36 . UJl~, oc . ci t. 
Chara ct eristical l y-, the nMutualH Defense Tre a ty 
be t ween the Uni te d Sta t s and the Republic of Ko:rea 11de"'ired 
• •• th a t· o pol i i c al aggressor co 1 db ~ under the i l u-
~ion that either • i l l st and al one in tte Pacific' i tal i cs 
added. ) , 0 7 eve n as Communist guns er e giv · .ng the lie in 
I ndo- Chin a . 
'h e second. op_ ort uni ty to a
0 
p ly the "New Looi<:ff 
·t rategy c "me simult an eously . I n J une , 1953 the East German s 
·rose in r~nrolt aguin ~t th e Co.ffi unL,t regi e . For some t i me 
t~ e quisl i ng U bricht governm en ... ha d no contr ol ave " the 
coun tr y , and bov i a t t an lt ::5 had to mov e in to restor·e ncommu-
nist ensl avement 11 of the German people . 
Vih at "i d Mr . ull s ·o to se ize '.his r'eady - macie 
op por·t unity to II i bera t e UF=> c a ti ve )eoples" ? The a.n~wer 
i : Not h in g , beyong. o pe· -1in g ~eal ki tch ns v-:ell a;•.-ay ""rom 
the East Berl i n ,ord ers. Food pqcka ge s ha d su b sti uted for 
11liber at i on 11, a.g".in, so soon af t er the bugle V':5S sounded ! 
Three year l a ter t.he lk ga.r i an people ' s upr i sin g 
was put dovm by Soviet massi ve intervention . Du_ es t ~x 
reaction was -'y_pic a ll:r Dull e ~i ~n: 1 w,~ do n·ot look u, on these 
ni.-:tions [i . e ., th e ·--us"'ian s a telli te~ 7 as _:wt nt i ,::l military 
c,,ll i es 11. 2'8 
in America n Foreign Policy 1 50- 55 , Bas ic 
v l .I , o ~. c it ., p . 89 7 . 
~s. The Ne , Yor~ ' im~~ , Oct ober t s , 19 56 . 
III . ' "T· A 'E y OF .aLI.t.r A_Io r 
Amcng a ll th · manif s t ations of the nNe 1 Loo k 11 i 1 
sia, t ·o o t .Jlt and. a s pe rf Act ex ampl e s of the spli · be t ,1.een 
t he desir e a.d t he deed , be t ~een over weenin g reliance on 
11ro l lbacE{n and unwil in gnes to t ake he co se que1 .. c es . 
I n both c ase s , the co st i n money men .j.. .I.. ' i. O L D 8 
United States ¥~· sou~h t to be made "be r · ble " y .cquiring 
_si an u/:J.l i es n to do t h e .fig h t ing and in bot h c ase s American 
i pl oroacy pa id a heavy politic al pr ice . Both result e. i n the 
United 0 t &t es playing the coloni ' l game of its Eur opef::.n 
:1ll i es . nd i n eit her case Amer ican policies ende u p i n 
dl i en - vi ng ~ s i an sentime nt rathe r than unitin g it t their 
One o"" thes e fo und expression i n th e c,i i t ~ry 
The 
c.l l i an c e v,i t h th e f le dg lin 0 state o _. Pa kistan . m~oc re su l ts or tnis 
on Americ an r elat io ns ~ith I nd i a , .. fghanis t an and the Ara b 
coun t rie~ ere to ·rove di s a stro us . The econd put the U~it ed 
St c.t es on the l on g r oad to i nvolvement in South eas :.~ia . 
This was the hatching of the s t rt:..t e ,y of 11ma ss1.ve retali a.-
tion11 a t t he Hbri 1:en i n I do- Chin a whi ch was to whim~' r 
the 
i n t t he 11misbe.;otten pc:,p :.::.r ti 6 ern of j' 'o It he o. t Asia Tr ea t y 
Organ i sation . 
·F,'e , ·ill d i s cus s the l!li l i t a :ry pa rtner shi~ w::i. th 
Pa ·~i stan i n this chat,1ter and t ak e u p the Un ite d_ S t a t es 
i mbro g lio in In do- China i tbP next . 
ehr1 Los es U. S. Fa vor 
I nd i a 1 s "u n committ ed " for·ei gn po ic y , which has been 
1· bell ed as Hneu tr al i sm" by the "comrni tt ed 11, ~\as ea r n i ng 
bad f ee.Li ng s f or he r a lr eady . He r 1 n o ' i n the vot i n:-· on th e 
mer-ic a. re olutio r i n t 1e U. • Genera rnsemb l y on Febr ary 
1 , l 51 br andin v Ch i na as aggress or i n the Kor ean ~ar re su t e · 
i n a fur t he r stiff en i n - of at t it ude to ta rd he r . 
Ho •;ever , t h u t the Unite d Pt a te ..... gov ernme nt in. l ' 51 
d i d not wrn t to do any t h ing ;hic h v.•ou l d b e int erp r e t e c:.S 
offici ally writi ng I nd i a of f ·;a s cl ea r fro m the rom_ptne"s 
vri t h wnic h i t res pond ed to I nd ia ' s re quest for foo d re li ef . 
he L1.d i a.n re q_1est it self sh o ~e d th t t he N,-=>hru & ~mi n istr c;.ti on 
to ward 
<i d not -ant th e f e elL - to gro -, th a t i t c.:tti tL de ~Qextt...e 
to ward 
Americ .n cond.1 ct of th e Kor e<:Ln 1.'ar an . X:tlf the Ch · na vot e 
mean t t ha t · nd i a. Vfas countin g t .:... n i t en S t tes out · s 
frie nd . 
Nev ertl less , it c:,s not sur pr i sin 6 th c1t the s ron.g 
o·p ositio to the nd i a Emer gen cy Food BiL c i me in 01 gre s 
fro .• the s me gr oup of'. t1Asi aLJ.t i on.istsir ·:h ic h bad e - rl i e r 
v ene mently r a i l d tha t Trum an and Ache s on hud 11 ol <~ Ch ina 
dof ,n th e r i v cr 11 • Ho w f · r th i s g roup wa · ro :--pon ·i ble fo r th e 
c.1.a.ra r f o r an a.11 - ou t wa r a.,.:.i n ·t Ch in e. c me ou t more cl~arly 
i n the .Mac ~rthur He~r in gs . I1 eh r •J. 1 s opposi t i on o thi s enla r g e-
men t o f th e ~-r ea rned h i m m~ny ep it hets ,b i ch wer e t o l ead 
to s ore fe el in gs for- a lon 6 ti me . The p ower f u l l Knowl f .. nd - wing 
Republic ans had c rrie d a "pa rtic l arl y vici ou n ti - Nehr u 
Vt nde tt a nl and r i sed the cr y for 11get tin g tou gh vit h 
Neh r · 112 . Mr . Dulles h i m,...elf ,as to eclare la t e r not oniy 
t ha T t h e c on c e t of "neu t r a li sm" was obsole t e 'u t »exc ep t 
under v ery excep +-ion afc i rc umst .snc -~ i t i s an i mmor: 1 , and 
. '?-
sho rt s i gh t ed c once Jt i on 1 0 • 
'I'he r~eh r u go v ernment had ac c ord i ng ly brac e<., i tse · f 
~o fa ce c ert a in ne~ t r ends in Americ an olicies •hen the 
Re pub ic a ns t ook of f ic e i n J · n ' ary , 1953 . I nd i a ' s e:x.c u.si on 
Ir:,_ from membership ~ the · ol i t i cal Conferen c e on ~ orea was 
J r ecede d by . r . Du les I agre i ng v,i tb u/ngm &n Rhee tha t 
~ehr u b el on g ed. to t he Communi t ca.mp nd , of c ourse , ~-ehru 
had s a i d t ha.t DLl.ll e s ' "bo l d s e e ches 11 i n reg ar d to the Fa r 
Eas t ••• ha ve c - u~ed gr2 v e con c er n .•.• Fro m the po i nt 
of vi e N of a psy chosis of fea r ••• they ha.ve had -:- bad 
ef f ect . . . . Th i s t : k somet i mes of a bloc k~de of Chinm 
o r ot he r su ch s t e p ob vio us l y i s n o t t he i n d op t a lk that 
/l l eads to peace o r se t t l ement·~ . 
Con c erning this deterior a tion i n tbe ti ,o count r ies ' 
rel~ t i ons .: r . Ches t er Bo ' l es , Ameri c &n Amba ~, s· dor ir 1 Nev; 
elh i , ~-r o te _ a t er : 
1 . Se - i . Harr i son , 11In d i a , Pnk i stun and the u •. ' .-- I: Ca . e: 
Hi st:ory of a ]1i s t c,..·e11/The le ReJubl i c , CXLI , .Augus t 10 , 
1959 , J;J. 17. 
2 . t, i ll i am u . \/;hite , ". ·ha t Bi 1 K O'.i,L :inu 2t ~nc1s ForH , The 
,; . ·, ,. epublic , C XXIV, February ~-7 , 56 . 
Z,; . Quoted i n Graebner , ker : I so l at i on i $ID_, op . c i t . , p . 24 6 
4 . Indiag r am, Ernbassf of I n ··1a. i n ',;'.fa0 hi .g t on, .ft'ebru · r y ;~. , 
1953 . 
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men Secret ary 01 Stu t e J orh~ Fo s t er Dulles visited 
I n i & in l · 53 he ~as greeted ~itn th~ Lt most cor~i~_ity , 
r nd I nd a- Ameri can relations still ~eemed on a solid footing . 
:,y t he f, ·:.11 of 1 95-z , ho ·.ev-er , t_ e pendulum v as s ,inging 
ba c agJ i n , i nfluen c ed by ou r op posi tio ·1 to I ndiz .' s pres en "e 
~ "' the · ore z.n Truce Conference anCl by ·i de l y cire l a t ed 
s t ories of American L .1vrigue i n su pp ort of an in°e}'endent 
Kas imir 5 . 
bout tha t ti me the Eise nh wever "dminis t r-·ion decided 
to pus thr ;1gh the ams - a id nea l v,i th Pakistan . 'I1:rrn" i ssu e 
he d been under Lhe Pentagon I s de lib eru t ion for t'I. long ,ime 
and , or ima f a.ci6-., here m ..... 0 t n-..t have be n any te mpora l 
coru-iection )e t ~\een t hL 1 decis i on an the rec 0 n t trend i n 
I n do- Americ ::tn relr::1 i ons-. But , a Senato r ulbright \,ar.ned i n 
~is speech of March~ , 195 4 in the Senate op_osing the P~~i s -
tan aid decis i on , it WctS i nterpreted , not with out cause , in 
• ew D lh i a.., an ~!\mericun cl: a lenge o !'Je.1ru I recent :'ore i gn 
polici e s and as an atter;iot 11to for ce his h andt," . 
Th e Political Costs 
In t he i nt roductory ch::>.pter y\"e dwelt on th intra -
re gio na l pov;er -.p· .tt ern of South er n Ar i a a:rm India I s ecial 
pos iti on .i n it . Th ... re g i on ' s common colon i a l bac.tegroun d , 
ex ressin g i tself i n a gener &l mi strust of an;{ f orei gn moves 
i n th a t .rea , V;as notea. and mention ·was made of 'the . r i:.Pry 
reoccup a tion of it s people~ ~i h +he betterment of their 
economic and ~ cial co nd ition s . It i ~ aga in s t this r eg o~al 
se t t i ng tha t we mu t look u on the U. s~ mi. li t a.r y a i d to 
Pakis t an . 
5 . Ato.bas.sado r ' s Report (f e . York: Hu.r: er & Bros ., 1954 ) , .. • :::,31 
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Mor eov e r, J. ak i s t an 1 s strain ed rela t i on~ 'tr., t h it s t vwo 
r e i ghbors, Afgha~i t an and I nd i a were , uart fr , r th wa r 
i n ash uir ?, i th I nd i a and the corf lict ove r the .l?ush too n is -
t an is sue i:i th .fgh a.n i s t an , due more to the rrutu a l i ties of 
the ir r e l ··ti ~,ns t h un t o &ny ba ic diff . r ence o f out ook . One 
has j us t t o r emembe r I nd ia und P1:;.Kist~ ·n ' s mut al Hi ndu and 
1usl i m "!lli n o r iti es , the i r c nimon b or de rs , common ri ver v.,a ter 
suppl i e s , common econ omic i nheritence , an d so on to real i .:z 
t ie fa c t of their clo se i nt erde penden ce . These 1 .. ro blems 
co ul d hav e been solve d on · y t hr ou gh re cognition of n ° ed f or 
each other ' s un r er st and i ng v,h ic h , aft er t ~e r r-;c,::,:1t .,_r aum··t ic 
ex_µeri nee of co mmuna l riots , ,,-oul d have c ome even..,LJ.Bly . 
Some o f t hese proble ms , such tho ·e regs.r d in g the ~ can '.1  
~a t er s , exch ange of ev · cuee prop ert ies , et c ., hav e in r ~ct 
been l arg el y solved . 
Even in reg ard t o the Kas hmir di spu t e , I nd i a and 
.. '-'-kist a n were t h en movin g neare r set tl ement . 11F e·1, of t ... e 
partie s conc er ned , however" , obse rves 4r . Har r i.on , n i sp t e 
t he fo.ct t ha t i n earl _y 195 ..-. t h e pros p e ct s f or a :-a shmir 
se t tlement were bet ter t h n at any other time. The chH,_c e 
s till e ist ed r h en Gr ah am met se cr et l y v,i t h the t wo sid E: 
i n Sep te mbe r 195'": and February , 195 3 11• 6 
s a mat ter of h i storical fa ct t he Pak l s t ani .r i me 
11in i s t e , J'..'4.r. Moh ,.mmc:.d t .li, h -·d vi si t ed De.Lhi i n A-..1gust , 1953 
6. Sel i g S . H· rris on , «c o~t of a Mi s t ~ke' , The New Re , ubl icJ 
CXLI , Augus t 2 1:1:, 1959 , p . 24 . 
a t Mr . l eh r u ' s i n vit a t i on an d tt 1~y had p1. t t h i r s i 6na tu r e s 
t o a s t , tem en t f i xing May , 19 54 a. S th e dead li ne for t he 
"pp oi t m0 n t of & pleb scit e admi ~i st r .t or. 
The D. S .- ak ist an arms pact c_ me wit hi n mont s of 
t hi s rieh r u - Mo.ht~mmad Ali agr e emen t. ttTh is c rea t ed no t only a 
ne w mi l it a ry sit uat ion but a r1ew po l i t i cal s i tu a.ti onu , as 
Mr . Nehru v1as · o ex pl a i n long a ft e r ·ra rds in 1956 , Hand the 
pr oc edur thus far follo v.ed by us b ecame ou t of dct t e and ad 
to b e vie wea af re sh . Tha t s i tu~tion has be come pr ogr e s s i vely 
worse b e ca .s~ of the flo v; or th_s mil i t a· y a.i d to P a ... tist an 
u7 
. . . 
The more a cti ve su pport of I nd i a by the Sovie t Uni on 
si n c e about t his tim e can b relat ed d ir ec t ly to its ef fort 
to cash L on America I s s nub to Yehru . Even th en :t-ehru s t ub -
bor n ly refu· ed. to a b andon 1i s olicy of _non - a l i gnment . But 
f or a gov ernment 1.hi ch prof . s se s to follo w a non - cou1mtt a l 
polic y to war d s e i t 1er po w r bloc.., 1.•efu sa.l to rr.:.:ipond to 
f rien d ly ov ert .re~ f r om on e side ~ou l d , i oso a c to, ·o~ea r 
to be unfri en to t ha t si de , especi all v ~hen the off 0 r is 
not preo.i.c a ted on ,.,_ny co mmit men t. It is submi tt ed t h., t h is 
way of ..... ookin .g t Neh r u t s conti.r,:u e · a ce f'~ptan c e of ' el p f rom 
both s i de s i <> no t le ss v a li r tb a n the one t _1at sees I ndia 
be n efit i ng by playi ng o:ne s i de aga in s t th e o the r . 
7 . Re y to d eba t e on .F'o re i gn ffairs i n Lo ·t cabha ., Mar ch ,-9 , 
1956 , p bli - he d i n In di a ' s For ei gn Policy, o;:i. c it.., p . 434 . 
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The effect~ of this mili t a r y t!e - up ~it h PaKi s t an o~ 
uneric ' .' s rel a tion r,i th Af 0 han i stan , Pi:!.'' i '-'ta n t 3 another 
ne i ghb or, vere mor e deleter io u • 'l'he de cline o ~ Amer ..:..ean 
pr es ti ge among t he Arab countr i e s and t he corr es pond ing Rus-
s i n ·· i ns ar e a l so, to a. gre a.t ext en t , du e t o th l a t er-
en l· r gement of U. , .- Paki s t an alli Jn c e i to t he so - calle d 
Bc: ..ghd ad Pa ct of which the Uni te a. St a te s neve r b ,c c,me a memb r , 
ana , on Ir aq ' s l a t er def ec ti on , had to be ren ame as the 
~ ~t o o r Cento P&ct . 
I nd i a Defl ected Jlrom Conc ern ~"i th Ghi.na 
The ti min g of thi s mi l i tary a i d t o Pak i s t an had ano t h er 
s elf - defe a ti ng effe ct f r om t h a point of vi e , of t he .meric an 
des ir e to deny to Communi s t C~l n~ :.ny ga i n s i n t hat rea . 
I nd i a has al ·vrnys reg a rd ed Chi na · s t he m' i n d~.n g er to 
the coun trie s o f Sou thern Asi a , e sp eciall y +h So..1the-ste r n 
n at ion s : "And it i ~ c ert i n th a t he UJehr · ] di d not uncier -
esti mate th e fe ar s fo r t heir sec uri ty hat exi st ed i . +he s e 
A • t · , i· d h . f'a i· 1·• t o n~ 1ne r.·n~.n- a ._. t ' -eJ· ....,,_ ~ si an coun ·r i e s , nor _ . - ~ __ 
sou rce 11 .. 8 
I n fa c t , I ai ~ 1ad defi nitel y become more appre hen s i ve 
of Chi na ' s des i gns af t er t he for ci bl e occup · tio n of Tibet i n 
1950 . After tl t , effortJ ~ere m&de to es t ~b l "sh some w~tc h -
po - ts ~long th e ~,ooo mile borde r ~1th Chin a n border 
mil iti a to patrol cert a i n ·::ire a s wa cre ate d . Mi l i ._,2.r y ec:.1,..i 1:s,.e t 
8 . Ro se n.· r y Br i ""se_iden ~ "I nd i a , Neutr alism an 1 Se a to 11 in 
Geor g e ·.o d el sk i ( ed .J, c-'eato : 6 Studies , (Mel b ourne : Aust r a -
li an Na tio na l Unive r ~it y , Mel bourne , 196l ) , p . F06 . 
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f o:r hi .,,h al ti t .:ide mounta i n operH t i on,s wer e al so acqu i red . 
I nd i an i nter e s t i n t-he bu ff er st a t es of Ne92 .l , i .ir..ki m, an d 
Bhutan found hei -h ten ed expression .. A spec i 2.l l y vulner ;:tb le 
ar ea alon · th e Ti betan bor der ··:as heav i ly fortified .through 
the Nort heazt Fro n tie r ' gen cy . Nehru ' s f ol lo'ling words ar e 
char a cteri sti c of that pe rio d : 
A. d nov,- our i n t erest in t he intern a. c ondi ti ons of 
Nepal b e co mes s ti l l more ·.cut e and person a l , i f I may say 
so, because of developmen ts cr o ss our borders , becau se 
o f develo 'oment ::. in Chin a and Ti be t, to be frank . . • 
Ther efo r e , mucn a.: we ... ap preciate the i ndepe n dence of Nepal , 
v:e ca nn ot r is k our ovm sec '1ri ty by anyth in g not c.onc i n 
Ne )a l ·which perm i ts e it t er t.h~i t bar rie r to be cro sp.ed or 
ot herwise l eads t o the ~eak enin g o~ our frontier s. J 
Out of this he i ghtAned conce r n ~i t h China Nehr u wa s 
reported to ha ve a cc epted a domest i ca ly ver y un _o pu l ar step 
in r egard to Kash i r , the ma in a i m of ½hi ch was to compos e 
di fferen ce s wit h Pa i stan: 
At the t ime of U. I!. med i a tor Fr ank Grahm ' s AIL::.rch 
[195).:J missi on ~ nd i a a nd Pa.Ki s tan] reached agreement on 
a var i at i on of the often - discussed part ition appro a ch to 
the .Kashmi r d i pu t e : P<iki st :in woul c1 ge t th.e Mos l em 
majo r i t y ~za d Kas ·imi r terr it ory on it s si a.e of the ex i stini; 
cease - fire line , l n 1i a would re t •, i n Hi ndu an B- dh:Lst -
m6.jority J ·-romu a.nd Ladal{h , an a ol ebfoc:i.te 1-·ould be h~,l d 
in the Ri m•· layan Vale of Kasbmi r .1 0 
PaKist an , As An Ally 
Mi litar i ly , p - · 1 stan ' s value to t he Uni t ed S t a t es h as 
b e en adjudged to be mar gi n;;;;l • 1 1 Pak i s t an I s · commande r - in - chie f, 
9 . Speec h on December 6 , 1950 ,! nd ia ' s Foreign Polic v ,o o . cit . p436 
JD. Harr is on , ucos t of a Mi s t ak ~ lo c. c i t . 
11 . f~n s J . M.o rgen t hau ' s co n c lus i on is : 11G ogr phy ma kes it i mpv s-
sib l e for t ha t PaKi st L~i army i n case of ~a r to gi ve eff ~ctive 
as i "t ei.nce to any of i t .s .11 i e s e it h er under t he Baghdad Pa ct 
or ea to o:"' r ece i 1e :tch ass ist dr,.c e f r om themt , ".Mi li t, ;.ry 
Ill u sions 11, The ·ew ;~e :mb lic, CXXXIV , Ma r c 19 , 19 56 , pp . 14 - .L6. 
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Gen ra l Mohaminad iiJI sa.,, h i ms elf i s rep r ted to ti.av e t old 
fr . Edgar Anse l Mo wre r, ~1ho •·ro t e i n an article i n Col l i er I s : 
P:iiki stan coul_ , n o t ·a.c, Generat l Mu a admi tte d) pr e vent 
C?rnmuni st ·_;.:.nd f ore s f~ m ad v 1:-nc i ng s out h and oc cupy i ~ 1 ... tne g re · t I rb.n i or I ra qi oi fi e.i ds or the ouez Canal Zone . · iG 
Do es Pa.Ki st n "'hare meri c ·-. 1 ;> c on ce rn · i th tr e Cornmun i t 
t h r ea t? Her e i s an answ er: 
Fo r Paki s t ·m. ••• ' a l l i an c e wi th th e g reat po\'\•ers of 
th e ~ est -- ch i ef l y the Uni t d St a tes -- h as me&nt , from Jha 
beg inn i ng, s ecurity not f r om Communi ·t Chi na bu t f r om 
In di and es c ate from di pionat i c is G· at i on vis - - vi s it 
_ owerful ne i ghb or . 'I'his much h s b een a"'mi t t ed -- at fi.rst 
unof f ic i lly , by Pak i stari schol ar s • •• an~ t h en by offi -
. 1 . . 1 ~ . . , . d .. 'J ci a spoKesmea • .• v i t il C- a a ea 
'Fr om the abo ve e va.lu t i on o f the Un i ted c tates ili t ary 
· lliemce 1 .. i th Pakist ::ln, i t v.ould appear· tha t t his ·M~s a wh o lly 
wr ong s t ep . 
Ho v.,ev er , Mr . J erne gan , a Jt ~te Department expert 01 
Ne ar Ea st , Sou th ' sia and Afr i c · wrot e : " •.. I b elieve the 
a< va:1ta g es wi l l fa r o u t ,e i gh th e d is a dv · n t age s b t h for the 
nations of hat are ctnd f or t he Unit ed St · tes ·n d its 
as soci a t e s of the f r ee world 11 . 14 We mus t urn ., therefore , to 
the t a.t e Departme n t ' s thinkin g on th e vaue of Pakist an as 
an a l ly . Mr . J ernegan wr it es : 
When Se cre t a y of St(:l.t e Dulles t oo 1 of f i e • . • he 
dec i de d to ha v e a. n ev: l ook a t t he v.ho l e probl m of Near 
East an Sou t h Asia ... In the spr i ng of ~953 he m&de 
an extensi -•e to u r of the ar e a . • • "'hen he returned he 
ha d t his to say : n. Mi dd le Eas t Defense Or an is at i on i s 
l r.::. c uote " i n Harris on ~ i b i d , p . f:· 
1 3 . Geor ge Mode1s ;' i, in Se--to : 6 Studies , o o . c i t . , p . 1 2'7 
14 . J oh n D~ J erne ·•an , "The L le Ea st and 801... th A "'ia -- ..1.'h e 
Pro b em o f Sec ·uri t yn , e par t men t o.f ' t :,;t e Bu l 1_gtin , 
Mar ch 2~ , 1· 54 , ~ . 44 8 . 
a f' ture th er th an imI: edia.t.e pos s ib"l.li ty • • • Ho'! c➔ ver , 
th,re is or concern v~er the Soviet Union is near . I n 
aeral , the northern tier o~ t a tes sho~s a ~arene~ of 
the dbn' er •.•• f hile ·~aiting the formal cre ~t io n of a 
security a oci b.tion, the United States cun u . .sefu~ ly 
help stren ~then the i nterre. ated defense of th ose co un tries 
which ant stre ng th , not s againRt each other or the w1gt, b ,t to re. ist the common threa.t o a ll free societiesn . ..... 
1 s part of' this HUni ted e ta tes usef u l he l :--1 , moves 
~ere initi a t ed in the fa ll of 53 . By Febr . ary 19 , 1954 
Tur:ey, ~~erica 1 s Nato ally , ~a s "helped" i n signing a .efens e 
pact t'i th Pa ·i st~n a.nd on Febr ary ~5 Pr esident E isef1.b.ClW€Yer 
was ng ad to compl y' ~ith Pak i.t an ' reque~t for mi li t a ry 
assist an ce . Tur · ey an 1 I r aq_ -were "he lp ,. If to come ' oge ther i n 
1955 , t hen Ka rachi and . nkara wer' : fa s+-ened to ether by th e 
Bag da.d b ckle and , . a month lat e r , the Bagh .ad ... ct ;,<;as bor:n . 
I t \as hinted ear l i er th 9t the Pentagon had for long 
been siezed of the i SS 1J.e of br i ngiYJ., Pa.ki !3 an i n t o a mi it a r y 
all i ance . Tis as:ect of the story has been pi ec ed toget ne r 
by (' r . ... ,e i g S . H-rris on16 • Marshalling document ar y ev-..:..den ce 
dr.,-v.,n mainly from Bri ti h an d Americ an so1,,1rces;, he sho ''S that 
tis~ .s ori inal _y a British i de a ~hic h w~s sod t o the 
Americans . le tr aces th e links b ck to an article written i n 
19 4- by a British g eopoliticia.n an d world - reno:;..~ed au thori ty 
on Centr al Asia , ir Ola f· i rk atrick C~ oe, t wice Forei gn 
Affc:tirs Secretary to the For ign Office in I di a be"'ore I nc'i':t 
be came free . 
16 . ibid, p . 445 
16 . "Case ' i story of a Mi stakt:l:, , o o . cit , p· .1 r - 7. 
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L that art icle Sir Ol af 1 idea "s t c f ill the 
po \-ier va cuum ar i sin · O L t of the Bri t ish exi t ..1. rom the 1 1dian 
s bco · tinent by brin g ing inde pe nd -.nt India i nto sm1 e sort o 
i->rangemen t to fil l th e r o s v.hich I mperiL. Bri tail had 
pl ay ed i n checkin ..; u th e be a r that ¥1~l l~s 1L-.:e a miln11 in its 
desig r s on the Mi dle East oil. Ho ~ever , by 1951 I n i a ' s 
po s i ti on i n t'_ e c ol c. i.:a.r r ad b come c e ar . •l,...ir Olaf , ther.,., -
for e , had to readju st hi 16.eas E .. nd i n 1951 he wro t e a 
hort. b oo 1 c a l ·.ed. the ~-e lls of l?o 1;er , whi ch ·ta s fran kly 
addresse ' to the ·mer ic ans 1 • In th i he r evise d his g eo -
poli t ic a l thi nk i ng an ", cons+-ru ting i:a g re at ov8.:.. or t➔l l ips­
t hr ough ela.bo:ra e map~ accompan i ed by l eng thy Ha · shof er - l' ke · 
analy is" conclude d ; 11~ ci r c le ·which , a il s to in cl ude i o.ki s -
t n {j..n a ' N'ort.:ie r n !."'-'.cr een ' along the Soviet C n tra Asian 
bore er ] i ~ i ncomp · e tert . 
I n Was h in ~~ton , Si r Ol r f 1 ..., fi r qt converts v;e re in the 
Air Fore , Mr . Harr is on sa y s , ~~d he quote s the l a t e Gen .Hoyt 
Vandenbe r g, th .n Air Force C' ief of utaff , a s gi ving this 
!tfri end ly arningl1 to A bas~ dor Bowle s ( v;ho 1•1"as aga i nst this 
i dea ) in e,")tember , 1 ~ 51 : 111;e ar e going t o giv e you some 
trou ble out th er e i n I ndi a becau ~:e •x,:, ha v·e our eye on bn.s-,s 
i n Pak i s tan 11 • 
C· roe p.rou 1 y t akes cr~ dit for i nfluencin 6 Ameri ca.n 
th· D' ing an d ea rni ng Pa.,,'lti .st a ni g r tit ude : 
My Paki t an friends regard me as the i1ventor of tie 
Bu~ t :a ct Pac t 1 I went on a tour of the US f or the Briti~h 
-FO i n lBi:::2 and h· d ta l i' vd t h Sta te ne par-t.ment o.f f ic~ a ls 
an r'l others on these l i nes , a n d :;>erh ap so 1e of t'·H~ 
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exch · n6e ~e ha d ;ere not vith out ef fe ct . I ndeed I h a v e 
more t han once ventureo. to f latter mr ·e l f t h~t J . P'. 
Dul les ' phras e 11' he North er r T'i e r u c n d hL , asso ci "'-' t ion 
o r the US 1 , ith t he Bag hdad cou nt r i es i n ' s i a wer e i nf l u -
enced by th, t h i m i ng i n the ·•Ne ls of Po;1;er . n t h&t book 
I call ed those co .ntr i e s , n he ~rorth er n Scree ~.:. 1-- the same 
i de a re ·- lly . l? 
4r . Har ri "on &lso ~ent i ons th e names o f the 8 h eir · r ch s 18 
ana the i nterconnec ti on s bet v,ee n them : llBr i.t i n ' s man n , i .! not 
s~~ ci f ically "S i r Ol af ' s man• f 8 P"kis t ~n ' · ex - Pr esi d en t 
I sk and er , ~- i rza ( -·ho was Jo L1t uefense Se cr et a r y i 1 British 
I n di a , .... nd b e c ame f m1se Sec r etar y bef or e ass ·•nin 5 the Presi -
d8nc; ) ; nh i s goo - fr i enri n , .Bri g . en . Har ry F . Meyers , . t h e 
U. S. Mi l it a ry Att ac h e in Khr cti f r om 1 48 t o 1~ 50; t he ~e t 
Po i nter , Gen . f en r - Byro ··d e ~·:ho e ap poi r t ment as Assis t;.1,nt 
Sec re t ary o m St a t e f or the Near Eas t , South .· s i a and Af ric ~ 
mar ked "t ' E t ·rni ng pointn (he also ac cora}ani d ulle "' on 
his S~ri ny , 1~5~ goo dwi l to u r);_ ad . Gen . Geor ge Olmst eed , 
Di re c t or of th e Of f ic e of i 1 i t ar~ . s i s t h1c e in the Pcn t &gon 
until mi d- 195 3 ; b e i des the dr Fo r ce Ch i e f of SL2.f f , Gen . 
V,..i.ndenber g , to 1•,h om 1"'e hav e al re ady re f erred . 
This res earche r has c e cke mo~t of the re f ere nces 
cited by Mr. li' rr i on and , i n ad.d i t i on 1 ~i s ove r e d mor e 
evi de ce cor r obor a tin g his mLi n po i n ts . 
The London Econom i s t i :J ~ J 1 y , L ,49 i s ::• .e wr ot e the 
f oll ,\ i Lg under t h e by i ne i·.t!y a Corre sponde t 11 : 
· 17 . klxk<x, _Q.Q. . ei t . 
18 . Obse:rvor ' s Ph i l i ;i Dean e ' s t er 11 f or e n i or Ar m1r of f icer s 
· nd Civ i l ser van ts . 
1 9 . I n 1958 , Si r Olaf · r ote the Patb· ns , 55 B . C.- 195 7 A. D. 
de · 1c a t i ng it to Hf,JJ_y F'riend I skande r Mi rz , , Pr esi:~en t of' 
Pa 1-i s t 1::tn , ir ' t 1-1..mon; Tho s e ·Aho : ho . i ng g r _ 'u.at ed i n 
l\tardun .:.,mong the Yusufza i s , are acl.mi t t ect t o 2 ife of 
f ello Vishi p i n t h e honorab l e company of ~a t han s" . 
Pa . .Ki s t r~' s - trate-gic im ,Jor t --nc e h a s b een g re u l y 
e .b·n c ed by a chaaie of emphasis i n the Mi ddl_ Ea st . 
The traditio na l British vi ew ha t eea th e Mi ddle East 
o r ..,y a s e. brL ge on the ro& d to I ndia , .1.n. tha t brid g e 
the keys tone OJ t he crc h was hb ~ue z c ~na' . ~o~ +he 
ae ro pl.3 ne has , a 'e th e e a s r.ern :Ji.edlterr an~ c1.n u nusabl e 
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i n war , ,:-:.nc.. the im port ,:1nce s i ll §iven t , the c ana l i s 
only a decent tr i bute pa i d t o D.i sra eli ' s memory . Toda.y 
i t i s oi l tha. t mat t ers . The st r~ t eg i c cr ux of the 1H dl e 
east i n o l cn ~e r C· iro , but Ab ·:>dan; Per ia , no t Egypt , 
i s the ~rize; an d so sudd enly , ba se s in ' ~~ ist ~n o~Ght 
to h ave become mo!"e i mpo rt un.t t an those of Egy }t or 
p ~1 estine . 
~.:ha t ~hi s article v,as ,.bvio ··sl y ad ar e ::s ed to t he 
Americans i s cle ar from : "Looki ng ·he<;d te n years it is 
po s s i b l1.; to see i n the economy o f Pc:dt l ~t an one o_ the · or l d ' s 
~re a t do l a r e a ·n er s ..:md. do ll a r sa ve rs , str- a teg ic a ll . .- tho 
lea d er o f the '- i ddle '~ast 1'c,o. 
Tha t th.is Br i tish st:r a ;.,e6 1 11,a s in fac t eve_ ua lly 
bo gh t by t he United Stu t es can be il l us tr ::ted f r om J.s, er icG n 
s ources . Mr . Dulles i s rep or ted to ha v e t o l d ~ r . rthur ean , 
h i s " confi d.:--ntn an d 11o l d l n.-w :,mr tn ern this , I'ega r d i ng th e 
cre at i oL of the BQghda d P a ct : 
He [Dulles ] wou l d say tha t the Joi nt Chief s 01 ~➔ taf f 
.,ere worried -b out t he t ter absence of ,-u1y rc-a niz e d 
de~en s e in the norther n Mi ddle Pa~t , he l a ck of a.nytn in g 
by ;,o..y of' a c oor ciin a t 0->d i l i t ary st r u c tu re t o preve1 t th e 
Rus si ans r rom t aL i n,g the entire a rea . Fo s t er wr u l d a ·· s o 
a r gue ha t -.;:e mu s t a l so sometimes do w'l1a~ th e Br i tis h 
,... :n ed , and could no t only be · 1 ~,o.y s as k i ng t hem to do 
wha t we v,.-~-.r, t ed • 21 • 
a ppr ovi ngly the urkis h Prime Mi nis t er as s~~p or ti ng t he 
~ .. Economi s t , 11The Role of raki<·tan 11, C JVII, J u ly ··z.., 1949 , 
p_o . 1?5 - 77 . 
;._-. Drummond und Cobl en tz , Duel ct the Brin k , QQ. it . , p . 149 
ak ist ·,n - Turlr is h nexus 11be t.r i n 5 in mi n d g eo po l it i c a l 
<"J• 
con sider a t i on, ·1 .. . . 
Ca lli ng Paki s ~an "~ lo ~ic &l c &ndid · te for t he mili -
t ar y a i o.11, .h ic h would give s ub s t ance t o etD. 11i d ea 1,:,hi .h n a.s 
l a ngu .i shed f or quite some t i me.rt, Wi .lli ;-m H. Hes ;.;l er , ;;h o 
erved ~ith the Vast Car rie r Ts Forc es ru r i g 1~4 ~ a nd is 
a1.. thor of Ooer l t io n Surv i v :.l ( 1949 ), v,r ote i n the Pr o c ee _;__q,g_~ 
of t he U. S. 1 ~val I n s t it ut e : 
The defense l in e of t he ant i - Sov ie t coalitio n of th e 
We s t run ~- in a gre a t irr egu ::i.r curve Sou th and E s t from the 
North Ca 9e of :for way to the Cau c a s c1s :Mou n t a ins . There a t 
the .. ia sternm o <~t ma r g ins of Tur:rn y it t op cold. . ·:cee -
Tu r k i sh - Yu.;os .La v rap p roa chment i s givi ng t..h"' l i ne n e;,v 
"oli d i ty i n it s vi t a ..L sout h eastern segm en • Bu be y on _ 
Tur t ey , ii:e fi nd pov e rt y , ag ... ar i · d ~ scon te nt , mi i t a r y 
:r e akne ss an d neutr a lism -- and there f o r e d n g r. In t .i s 
i:;reat , nd ne gl e c ted re ~io~ of Mi dd l e and 'o th .,. i a., the 
1° ad er s of the Wes tern de,o crac i es f i r d a massi v ch~ 11 en g e 
And in t~ i s a re a , as c nse qu ence of ba~ ic ~e ogra ph ic 
rac tor , p ~kist ~n h a s a · i hgu l ar str a te g ic i mport sn ce . 
He con clu d- : "The attr a cti ons o~ a Unit ed s~a es -
Pa.: i s t an entente are soundl y based , bec au s e they re . to n t h e 
soil d found a t i on s of mi lit&ry geo gr r 
Si n ce ---'•o~t o f th,., i nf o .mat ion r e la ._,in_O' to so r (3ce nt a 
p riod is s ti :.l hi ghl y cl ~s i f i ed , no d e f i n · t · ve ccou n t ca ~i 
be wri t ten c..t th i s time . Y~t , th tcre i s enough evi dence to 
sho 11: t h · t , a l tho ugh the P e .. t · ?'On had ecome c o ;. ·erted t o t he 
Britis h s t ra t egy lo ng a.go , the I dea coul ~ sold to th e Stat e 
G~ . QQ. Ci t . , . 4 .5 
~3 ._ 11Pc= Ki."t an and the H.:Lmal ~yas 11, .LXXX, A.ugu :::t , 19~.>4. 
Depa rt ment on! y i n li::153 , v,.nen t he ....,is enhower - Dull 0 s new 
di plomacy mi x bec ame □or e amenc.J.ble to mili t·1r y thi iting . 
The t the ar~m.,tn g of.' P · k i s t a.n would. not only bE.- c _eap 
bu t woul d fi t i n ?is enho wever ' s el ec ti on de cl - ration to 
"let th e Asi ans fight t he sians" i s bor ·ne ou by a m.unber 
of s t a t ements . Defense Se cret a r y .eJ cElroy , f or example , 
compare d t~ e ,,3 , 51 5 re qu i red · o 1;a 1 ., f e<:-d,.5.n' h ou s e r.-.:.n 
. . 1 ·' . . t ·· ' 45- t f D - • t . ""'4 d American s uie r w:1 n tn e ;,p - ::> co .;, o a 1 a1n s ·arn - an 
t ha t Pak i stan i s "we r e a warr i or p0ople •.• tough ••• _ a inl y 
ix - foo t ers .•• r ugg ed e- t er 
C J:;') 
of' mea t an d whea t" Y 
Mr . c. 1. r oadh ouse , a Bri t ish Conse rv a tiv e M. ~ . 
and c.n ex - .. dr ecto r of the Royal I ns t itute of I nternati ona l 
A.f f · irs , compar es the Br it ish oii int er e s ts and th~ A. e :-2:lcan 
a i m of "rolling back 11 ovie t Comm 1n..i.sm a.s i,he mEin nat i ona l 
i nterests of th e t wo coun tries i n Mi ddl e 7 ast . 26 
That Pak i s t an •~s se l ec t ed fo r "r ol l i ng ba ck" the 
Sovi e ts i s als o c l e· r .fro m th e St a t e D0pa r-t ent ' s 01Nn wor d s : 
'I'he Pa ki s t an Gov e r nment had shown its awarsness Ol , 
the da ger [o f Communis m] , and i n t he st a t e of th e 1,,.0:rl d 
today it di d no t seem go od polic y t o rebu f f tho se uho 
t hink as ~,e co and who can c ontribu te to t he "'ecuri t y of 
t he free ~or d on which our o~n securi ty depends . 27 
.nd yet .e have s een how Pa: i s t an look ed upon the 
Communist thre a t even a t t he t i me the a.i d . pr ogn ,m was be i ng 
moo ted , not to men t i on her later hobn obbi ng v itL th e Communist 
States . 
4 . ~eil H. McEl roy , "Mi litary Ass i stance" i n For e i gn As ec ts 
.-;;,f U. s. ~ n.t i ona .... Security : Con f eren c e Proceedings (\':as hington : 
Commit tee for Int ernat i onal Eco nomi c Growth , 1 ~58 ) p . 34. 
85 . Quo~ed i n Harrlson , lac . cit. 
~6 . Br i tish PoliQ, Y_since World War IT ( Ne >i Yor k : Praeg e r , 19 60 ) pl, 34 . 
f 7 . J erneg n , lac . c it . 
I n h i s b iogr ap hy Nixo n , Ral ph Tol r~dano s ... ys t h,~t 
on h is ret u rn from a sto pov r in 'a r a.c ' i i n Dec ·:mib er· , 1 953 , 
Mr . Nix on , Repub i e t-n Vice - Presid ent , had ur g ed the al l i ance 
w-il,h Pakis t an nnot for it s pur ported def exF v a.l 1 e ag r·inst 
Sovi e t aggressi on but for the very reason t ha t Pa is t an 
sot gh t the aid --' as a counte r - f o r c e to th e confir med neutr a li ty 
of J a.waba rl a r ehru ' s I nd i a t ti ) ::8 
\Fi'e also know the shifting f ortun e s o.f the Ba gh c'a.d 
Pac t an d tb s fac t that the United St ates did not i nte n d , from 
the b eg in ,. in g , to become a full memt e r of t h', Pa ct . 
The mi lit a r y agreement v·i th Paki ..:tan i s thu p erhc.r-is 
the bes t exam pl e of ..,he 11Nellli Look 11 pr eo c cupation 1;'.:i th Co.r:mu-
nism a.s a military t hrea t, ,-;..nd o.f thin k i ng of 11rol l i n · 11 it 
back by buy in g u p a l lies who e real concern lies el se whe re 
than with the ''de~truct i on of th e Sovi et 1emonn . 
28 . C).10ted i n B- rrison , loc . c i t . M:1' . Rans on Ba ldwin , The 
Ne~ York im es 1 mi i t ar y ana .1ys t i n the ne v,spap ..... r t s i s su e 
of December ~;-", 19 53 also ga ve this as th e re a son fo r 
ex t e J1d.i ng mi l i t ar y a i d to P -- k ist a n : 11The prob· em v,h ich 
the Pak ist an arm s a i d i int en de d to reliev e • •. s t ems 
chie f ly f'rom the de cline i.n po wer o f the Brit i sh Empi re 
· . •• Bu~ the _o s t pa r rise of n a t i on a i sm i n ths Mid dle 
E. -~ a.nct lL i a , p us t he incr easin g t hre a t of' Communism 
<:'in d .l'eh r u 1 s anti - '.l\ ester n is m, alt er-d t he -::ntire str a t eg i c 
ict u '"'e 11 • 
IV . SEATO: THE I JVE TED HROLLB. CK11 
The ".New Look" se ~·dling , pl ~n t ed by the II As i &l ·· tionls t s n , 
nurs ed and c ared by Se cr etar y Dulles , ith 11bo n lullabi es , an d 
n ouris hed on a nbud ; et - b nl anci ng 11 di et , flo wer·ed into t h e 
J outhea st Asi a Tre a t y Org imis a.t i on i n the ba ckyard o f Red Ch ina . 
Bu~ it so hap pened th · t it stron g , uns avor y smel ls "roll e. 
ba ck 11 more f r iends t ha n enemies . 
I ndo - Chi n " : Th e Fren ch ncountry 11 
Sea to was a, ty x ic a lly Dul l es i an sol u ti on · o an old 
problem ri-hicb h ad dog ged the Americ&n policy - ma ·e rs ever 
since VJ Day -when t he J apa.nese occ upat i on ended i n Ind o-
China , in the eas ter n win g of Sout hern Asia . 
We h o.Ve rot ed. earl i er th a t un der the J a pane"e occupa -
ti on t he loc 0 l l ea,.,.e::::s i n Fr en ch I n do - Chin a h a d enjo y ed so me 
i .ndape ndence . Bef or e they l ef t, t h e J a,. <---ne e had divided it 
i n to the t h r ee k i ng doms of Vietna m, La os an d Camb odia . By 
the nid dl ~ of 1945 , Vi et nam' s Emper or Bao Dai had alr eady 
become a phantom figure an d i n Augus t he aud ic a t ed his t hron e 
i n f a vor of Ho Chi ,i inh wbos e p a rt y , t he Vie tnam I nd ept:nd :.-nee 
Lea gu e, b ett er no vtn as the Vi e tmi nh , h a· set u p a gov er nmen t 
over the entir e co .nt r y . I n Sev t emb er Ho ct~clare d i rdepe ndenc e 
of the Democr •tic Republic of Vietn am. 
Foll owi ng the Pot ;:;dam dec i s i on , t wo Separa t e par ties 
of British an d Chinese tro o s were sent to dis a r m th "-' J apan ese . 
The British , o er a tin g in t h e t err i tor y sou h of t he 16th 
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p·rallel , i ed to i t rpr et their . ii !:ion or t h ems.o, ve-
nd he l ped th Fr ench i n reestablishin g themselves in th a t 
ar ea . The Chi nese , on th eir part , let Ho conti1.uie\. in the 
north , ho ·. i ng to exert the i r i nfluence i n Viet_ "tm t h rou gh 
him. 
Ho ·,e ver , Ho Ch i Mi nh nd t he French de ci ded to mc:.ke 
a dea in Ii! rch , l 46 . A decl a rati on was signe d •Rh ere by the 
Frenc h reco gni sed t he Re1~ublic of Vi etnam as a 11fre e s .a te, 
ha vi ng it s o gover nment , arliamen t, army an t r easu r y , 
belon g in g to the I ndo - C i nes J ]'eder :i ti on a.nd t he Fren ch 
Uni onn . But , as i:<'l en Hammer 0oints in he r st udy , Th <.➔ St r u ggle 
f or Indo - Chi~, Ho Ch i uUnh prov ed too c onc ili o t o ry to the 
Fr "n ch nd t he v ery su b st tial economic, mi l i t ury , an 
politic -., co n c essions he grc:.nted to then 'Aere att a c .l1.°:ed by 
, 
oth er n at i onal i st group s . ~ 
'I'he Unite d Sta te s go vernm en t a t th a t t ime was 
uneq·ivocal yin f'avor of i n "e e1dence of coloni a l t erri+ o-
ries. Se cret ar y Cordell Hull rec al ls Roo se v elt ' s co ment 
t ha t he c se of I do -Chin a His p erfec tl y cle· -r . Fr · r..ce has 
mil ked it f or one hundred ye ars . The pe opl e of I ndo - Chin a 
.... 
are en t i t led to so methin g be tt er t .an th a t " . ~ Th e Vi e t n in h 
had , the r efore , placed a lar e st ore by r e cent American 
prono uncem en ts ex r e ssin g dis ap pro v of Fr en ch i mper i alis m. 
Robert Shap l en repor t s t h a t an 11.meri can Intelli ge 1ce Officer , 
1. (St anf or: St nfo r d Universit y Pres ~ , 1 958 ), Jp . 1 ~4 - 55 . 
~ - Corde 1 1:ull , The Memoir s of Cardell ,..i.u l , Vol . II ( ;~ew Yor k : 
~-
1
- cm1·11 ·~ 1 9 118 ;' n 1c::a7 u:.1a ... ...l...c. _1 , .- "+ , :::,., -. v...,• • 
who had para c_ uted i n to Vi etm i nh ' s j un e hec .dqua r t e r ,;: !l '>d 
fo n c 'Z "u nre st r icte d nffe cti on for a l l Ameri c r ns H . ..: 
The Amer ic an a ttit ude of those d ay cont r asts shar p y 
1 ,i th Mr . Ri ch' rd Jli xon I s fo llo v,ing · a r ning t o t .9 ·r cn ch i n 
l ut e l 53 : 
If _you r countr y (I nd o- Cbina ) L to )e i nde~ e , ent and. 
fre e , it i s f i r s t n e c e s sa r to defe~ t the r pres en t ~ti v s 
of Commun i t i mpe r i a li sm on you r soil . Those ~ho ad vocrte 
( rem ov al of th e Fren ch t r oo ps f r om I nl ,o- Chi na ) mus t know 
t ha t i f su ch a cour se i s a opt ed i t ~i 1 mean no t i nde -
p nae.n e e but compl e t e do i n&ti on by a for e i gn pore r . 4 
( i t li e · a e ) . 
I n the me rt i me, wh· t bad h pp ene d was br i ef 1 t ' is . 
o so one r did t h i nk dr y on the Fre n ch - i etm i nh agreemen t 
of ar ch , 1946 t han the Fren ch s ta rt ed r epar · ng to re t ore 
+he i r colo ni al ru l e ov er t h e v,h o le of Vi etn am. B A' g a . t of 
t hat yea r F're nc h a tt a c lis on the Vie tmi nh had s t a r t ed an d by 
Dec G b er , t he pi ec emea l Fr ench effort s h avi n ' f a i le d , ge nera 
ho sti litie 0 b e gsn . 
Up t il. 949 , t he Ame r ican gov e r nment kept a l oof f r or• 
the goi ,.gs - on i n I n · o - Chi na ; but the s cce:ss of Communi sm L 
Ch i na caused concer n ov er th e f a t e of Sou t heast sia . I n an 
ef f ort t o nco n t aj _n 11 Communi sm and to but t r ess t h e dis tr essed 
Fren ch a ll . , t he Tr uman admi r i s t r a t i on r e cogn i ced t he Fr ench 
pupp_ t Bao a i 1 Vi et na m a s an i ndepe~dent t a t e ~h i ch • a s 
pr ec ea ed by th e Communist bloc r e c ogn iti on of .h . Vi E:tmin .h. 
Dean Acheson de cl ar e tha t e "Sovie t acknowl -dge nen of 
o f' Bo Chi ~ i nh 11, 'l'h.e Report e r , III, J -=-nuary 
4 . Quo ted i n urae hne r , Th e New I ol a.tio n L, m, op . c i t . , dl 59 . 
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t h is mov ·me.nt shoul d. remove any ill · si ns 2,s to the ' ne.t i' 1-iali t ' 
n tu.re o: Ho hi · i nh ' s a ims and r ev8al Ho i n h i s tr ~e colors 
as the mor t al enemy of na ti ve independence ir. In do - Chi nu 11 .5 
France was extended mat er ial help but the Democr at i c 
Admi n i st: r t io n , conscio u.s fro , th . begin,.11,in :y of e v ntual 
French colla ps e , ne ver thr ew. cau ti on to the winds and ever 
commit ted the Uni te d St a t e to a' l - ou t particip ation or to a 
! I var to Wi n l1 • 
The 1 Ri m of Hel l ' hesis 
Thus , v,·hen t be ·,e publ ic an admin i st r at i took o ver 
i t sa · t he F'rench g·1rden in I ndochina b l a e , fed by s t r ong 
wi d ., blown from the 1 ·ng o~ the Chinese ara --•on . When the 
fa 1 of the French for tr ess of ien i en . h~ b ecam. i m Lent in 
A~Jri l, 1954 , the shrewd Fren ch , ai;:a.r e of iA:r . Dulies ' me lani c 
anti - Com.mun· st z eal , r ised the wolf - cr y i.~i t h renev .,ed ent hu -
siasm . •r . Du l s , unwilli ng to spend on an ex:pensi ve op e r 3.-
t i on of fi hti n a jungle fire , of fe red ins t ead to at m bombs 
a.nd more 11massive 11 he ll - ~i re f rom ne r.hy air - bo r ne fi gh ters . 
Ho~veve r , whe n the British and Mr . Du les ' o wn C_ ie f of Army 
<"'t a ff, G0 ne a i Ri dgvmy , whl spered t h ... t round. forces woul d 
be r equired immediate y f ol owin g the a ir - str ike , th Fir e 
Chief relented . The re af ter , Mr . Dulles decided o r ~ce - av· ng 
5 . U. S. Dep~rtment of ~t ate Bulle ti _ , XXII , ;. 244 
6 . J am· s Shep l ey ( Li f e, n- o ... .,-.ulles ri.Vert ed \~1,L n) , oo . cit,._ 
p . 7.::, quotes Mr . Dulles tellin g him ... h a t 1tat th e S · me t i .me 
two U,.S. &i rcraft carr i ers , t he Boxer a.no. th e Phi_i pn i ne 
Sea s t eamed tow a rds the So ·1th Cnirn, Sen . Abroad \'.ere t i1eir 
t &ctic a l ai r g ro t _ps armed s i th '-tomi c \';ea pon s" . 
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11 pos t 1 re of s tre ng th " to ee p the Fr ench an d. .Sr i tis ' f rom 
1 captthlatin g to the Com unist ne 6 ot i "'t ors at t he Ni ne Na tion 
Gene va Conference . Mr. Dul es ,J-:...d. a t v.o - pr on ge pr e · sure 
on the neg oti a tions : one of 11uni t d a ct i onn -- his trgo:- .i t - a lone" 
wish ha vi ng been s cu t t l ed by the l ead er s of Congress whom h e 
ca lled for a sp e cial b1·ie f ng -- un d t he oth e r of a perm&nent 
coll e ctiv e defe nse or ganisation f o r South east lsia . The 
story of these pr essur e s a· a the re~e;tm en t ~ they cau~e 
all ar oun d has b e en wel l to l · by Mr . Cha lmers M. Robert s 
(" The ' ay We Di dn ' t o to War" ) 7 and ~ro f esso r Char l es o. 
Lerche, J r . "The Un it ed St a te s , Gr ea t Br it a in , and Se a to : 
A Cas e St dy in th e Fait AccomDli" ) . 8 
Eo~eve r, ii> r . Dull es had used the occ &.s i on to t.'.ev el.op 
hi s earl i er th es is of 11nu cl ear e t er ren ce 11 i nto · doctri n e 
.of Hmass ive, i nstant , r e t al i a t i on!! of' "more mobi l e det err ent 
pov.e.rH to be emplo yed 11a t pl a ces of cur choo ·in g " , in hi s 
a rtic le i n the For e i gn Aff .i r s L sue of Apr il , 19~4 fr om 
~hich . e quoted extensivel y i n Ch bp t er I I . Ref l ecting l a t e r 
1-'-it h an eye on the Pre sident i 1 el ection in 1956 , Mr . D ... :t:Lles , 
i n t he Li fe art ic e-- a so re fe r r ed to i n Chapter II -- .. pide -
f , 11y c:ca i d : 
You h a.ve · to talte ch ance . for '1ar , ,iu s t a s you must 
t _e chances f or ea ce . ~ome s ay th a t we ~ere br 6ugh t to 
7 . The hc oort e r , I I, Septembe r 1 · , 1954 , p . 31 - 35 . 
8 . Jo urn; l cf Po l it ic s , ~ugust , 1356 , r e ri nte d i n h i s 
Read i ngs in I n t ernat i ona Pol i tics (Ne York : Oxfo rd Un i -
vers ..;. ty Press . 19 5t:5) Jp . ~ 9 -1 0 0 . 
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the ver ge of ~a r . Of co rse we ~er? br ought to the verg e 
of v,ar . The abi;l..it y to get to th 0 v erge •J.:i thout ge tt ,i 1g 
i n to the war i s the nece ~·sary art . If you c<.,nnot master 
it, yo u i ne vit·-bly ge t i n to .,.-•;ar. I f yo u. tr y to run av,ay 
fro m. it ., if yo u are - sc r ed at the brink, you a:re lost . 
We ' ve had to loo k it squa r e in th e f a ce -- on t h ~ esti on 
of enlc ir 0 i r~g -'-he Koren n 1.'ar, on t he question f g e tt in ,. 
i n to the I nd o- Chin a 1ar , on the question of Formosa . ~e 
--..~ l1:{ea. to the briru• and we look ed i t i n the f a ce . \ :e 
took stro ng action . 
It too£ a lot more coura ge for the Presi dent t hun fo r 
me. Bis ~as th e u lt i ,-ete decis io n . I di d 1ot have to make 
c.ec i s i on myse f , only to recom mend. it . The Presi dent 
n ever fl i n ched for a minute on an y of thes e si· uation s . 
He came up t au t.3 
Whil e Mr . Dul l es ac: perfect i ng irbrinkmansh i p t1 the 
Geneva Conferen ce produced solution agre eable +o a l l 
incl ud in g the French. The Amer i can ~eleg a ti ,n did not s i gn 
the _gTeement but s t a ted thf.1.t the Unit e - St at es wou ld 
"refrain fro ~ the th r eat or us e of f orce to disturb 0 th e 
dec i' °do ns . l 
Nevert ~""el ess , ' he Genev a cc ords ·were f ound a.ek ing 
i n "some situation that at leas ... i1e co ul d c :1. l a modus v i v endi '1 
';-hi ch ' r . Ei se .nho wever ha d earlier sa i d the Unit~ l S a t e s was 
wor ki ng, fo r 11 . From J"une 3 to 1 , even befor - the si gn in g of 
the Gene va · reem m t on J uly ~1 , a Conference on Sou t he ~s t 
Asian Defen~ - ,,·. s be i n g hel · in Washi ng ton among n:'iiLLtary 
repre sen t a tives of the Unite Sta tes , Brita. i n , Fr c;1n ce , 1~ st 1"'.::,li a ., 
a ll fro m outsid e t he So-··.the ·n Asian re g i on , o f tn d a 'better 
9 . J a...'1:'.18S 3 ·,e_f;~.ey , OD , C t. , p . 78 
10. Depurtm en t of _St at e Bulle .in, J ul y 'l , 1, 54 
l . Tr1.e New York Ti mes ., Apr i l ::..6, l' 5·1 . 
6 
1modus viven j,H. Sou t hea st As i a i"' of !t rc.n <-:cen d.a•'lt i mpor t ance 
to us 11, : r . Ei senh owever ha ,.. s:=-i d on Mar ch f4 ' nd O A_µril 7 
he addea: 
ou Lav e a ro w of domi noe s s e t up , and you kno -
over f irs one, and what ~dll ha pp en to t he l a ~t on e .-
i s t ~e cert gi nit ; that i t ,i ll go over ver y ~u ic k l y , 1~ 
meaning t h,:1t I nd.o- Chi n.s, fe ..L.l, the oth er 801 t };leas t _s i a.n 
11do:mino es 1' v,oul d a lso ~o::.i )l e dot ,n • 
.. ' 
It :n. s , ,her e ore , esser it i a_ to sa ve all of So:_ltheast 
.s · a , if it can be Qaved; i f no t , to sa ve es en +i a l xa r·.s of 
i t' ;l '"'. To t h i s end , h1rrie d i nvit. 3.t i ons t o vih oe ve r v"~nt ed t o 
come and join w re i ss - ed . flTbe cou n ries wLi ch i ndi c ; ted 
t he ir · n te n i n of be i ng repre sen t ed nl4 met fro, e_pt e.mber 
6 to 8 and th e Sou t heast Asi c Coll ecti v e e fense ·.1.re a tr, ~-, : ;J.-
l ar ly :i:cno ·;n a"' Sea to, eme r g ed . £'St er e in g r a tified by the 
v~rio us member s t a t e s it came i nt o ef fect on Feb r u arr 1~, . 55 . 
':
7e sha ll nov: u r n to an ex: mi na ti on of the ma.in fro v i ion~· 
of t h- re a t y to se v.-he he r an hov f a r th e./ come u p t o th e 
pr oclai med. ai:u s and met hod s of the 11New Look 11 str a t egy . 
' ·he pr ovi i on s r el at i ng · o the areas protect e ·1.;y the 
Treat y a re most loos ·ly co nst r1 cted anc do no t admit of a c ea~ 
ae.:. i ni t io,_ . Ar t i cle VIII r ead s : 
As u se2 i n th ~s Tr eaty , the ' t reat area ' i s the geA· r a l 
area of Son t h- 2as t Asi a , i r.c lud in g al o +-he enti r e te rri -
to r ie s o f the As i a n Par t i es , a£ d t h gene r e _ area of t h e 
12. Quo ted i n Do;. ova.n , .t:.·l. senn0w er . t he I n s ide Story , Q.__Q_t t., p . ~{' l 
1 3 . Th6 Ne¥ York Times , Jay l ~ , 19 54 . 
14 . Co le c ti ve De fen s e in Sou theast a s i a ( - ondon : Roy~l I nsti -
t ute of I nt ern a '-i onal .Aff a irs, 1956 ) , ~. l . 
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Sou t h- West Paci fi c not incl uding t he Pac ifi c area no r t h 
of 21 degrees mi nute s north katit ud e . • 
The ex_pres i on "the P a cifi c area nort h of ~l deg re e s 
3 minu t es nor t h l a ti t ;.1 e 1! , se e m p) , a cc ordin g t o 
inter pr..,t at ion , '~excluaes Hon.6 Kon and orm s a a. " · lso 
Korea and J au an from t he benef i ts of th e Tre; t y , bu t Ameri -
can , ustral i an , British , Fr ench and Hew Zeal nd te r ritories 
i n South .t;as_ A i a an · th e Sot th Wes P.,a.cif i c 11 south of' the 
li ne " 1ould appear ( t • be covered , des it e the st a temc t made 
by Mr. Dulles , i n a report on the Treaty transmi t te d to the 
Uni ted St a te s Sen at e n 10 r ovembe:r , 195 4, t h1:2.+ the imita -
ti on of the meri can co uni tment un er Artie e IV I, to 
Comm nist agg re sc i on ref e cted ' the spe ci a l po si ti o.,,,. of t he 
United " t tes as the only party v,:hic:h does not h .sY ci.ny 
terr i tory i n the r eaty are~' . 15 
I ndones i a , Bur. a , ::1nd Ceyl o are c e &r.ly i t .i.:in the 
areas covered by t he Trea ~y , alth ough the se t res St a tes , 
a l ong ,. ith MaL-Jy..:i. a f t er he became i nd e , end en t i n 957 , are 
no member an d ha v e re f u s ed to do any t i1in ·d t h eato . 
Si mil a rl , th St : tes of Canbodi~ , Lao. , nd " ~he free 
territory under the jur i s i ction o ... th e ~t a te of i etn e.mn, 
which , 11 nder press ur e f ro m ~r . Dull e s" ,16 r,er e 11des i gnate d 11 
by as eci a l protocol s igned si ~u lta neous l y ~it h the Tre a t 7, 
have ne v~r sho~ n over - ea ge r ness o s eek Se a t o ' s good offices . 
The Pr i me Mi nister of C·mbodia ha s vehe men tly denoun c ed Beato , 
1 5 . I h id , pp . 11 - l f ' . 
16 . God.d- Ad·ms , Dul~es : A Rea pp ·a i sa l , ~ cit ., p . 140 . 
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and s cor ned the i d ea of se ez:in -::· its p rot e cti on . l"/ The n ev; 
Coal~ t i on Gov ernmen t of La o s , i ns t &lled on J une ~t , L:168 , 
.s.nnounced on th e s ame day that it .' .;oul d no long e r reco ,::'.'ni ee 
Seat e ' · prot ecti n an d th~ t Laos would abi a e by t he Five 
Pri n ci 1J es of Pea c eful Co- ex.is ence 11, accor d i g to a repor t 
i n the t fH York Times of J ne Z3, 196!:. ( The ea r-li er aos 
Gov ernment a l "'o had " e schewed any dir ec t technic '· l or 
e c onomic aid under Se a te - us9 ic es 11l8 . ) 
Wha t ar e the a i m. and purl-'oses of Seato ? 
1 . rity Ai ms 
A. Overt Mi l it .'.irY Ae;gre ·s i on : By Article IV I ) of 
th e Treaty E~ach si gna torj l ~•oul d co ns i de r t h at 11a ggress i on 'by 
means of armed at · ck in the Tre a ty a r ea ag 1:. nst an y of' t h 
Part i e s" o r a.ga i n ~t a 11des i gnated 11 ~tat or t e rrit ory 11..ould 
endanger it s 0 1m pe a ce and safety rt . I n s 1ch an even t , ea ch 
party " :vill " c t .... o mee t the common dange r i n a cco r da nce ·; i t h 
it s constitutional pro c esses" . 
Th e corre s ponding Artic le 5 of the Nor t h ·_t lantic 
Tr ea t y , by way of com arison , commits each pa rt y to reg ~rd 
su ch ~ n ttack as an a t t ck rr ga i n s t them a 1 u an - t o t a.n:e 
u f'ort hv--i t h , i nd ivi dual ly a.nd in concert ?;i th the othe r 
? ~rtie s , u ch a ctio n a s it d eem · ne ce s s a ry, incl u d i ng t h e 
use of cr m · forces" . 
B. Sit ua ti on~ Ot h er ·~rmed Attack : Para ; r a p_ ( ' ) 
of Article IV p rovi ~s t ha t " i f i n t he op i nion of a~ of t h e 
18 . i~i j , -9...Q. • cit . 
17. Macmahon W. Ball, 1 A Poli ti cal Re-Examination ."of Seaton , 
Internati on al Organ is ation, XX, 1, Wint er , 1958 , p . 17. 
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Partie ", tb(1 i nviol ~bi.lity or th_ int er t y of t he territ or y 
or t he so v_.r ei 5nty or politic al in depe nden ce of any Pa rt .7 
i n the treat y rea or of any other .. tate or te rritory to 
Y,hich t h e ;>rovision s of pare.gr ph l of thi s Art i cle from 
time to tim e apply is threa te ni-"d by any fa ct or s it a tion 
1rrh ich mi ght endanger th e nel'.lce of the a:cea , the Pa r t ies sha ll 
consu t im ed i a t e l y i n or de r to gree on t e meas·re vn ich 
should be t a en .i'or the common e.,..ence 11• 
It mus t be noteo. th u.t any act i on non the te rrit or y ri 
of a nctes i gna t ed n ar re i s e~clu ed by .Art icl e IV ( 3) nexcept 
at t.1. i nvit a t i on or wi th th 0 consent of the Gover nment 
con e er ne d 11 • 
" • .,.,.conomic an d Socia Aims 
The ho rt a.ti ve Pa cific Charter , proclaiming a gener l 
st a t ement of pr i nc i pl e s,, was dra wn, a cco rding to Mr . Dull e s , 
to mak~ it cl ear tba t th e See.to owe rs t1 ~rnre see Kin g t he 
wel far ~ of th e A ian pe op e and v\ ere no t pro mot in g, 
' colo nia lism 1 11• Th is ·nd th e Pr eamble to t he Trea ty, and 
it s Art ic le I I I spe cifically , provide , an ng oth er shi ~bo-
eths , f or co ope r a tion "mong th e sign to r ies 11i n t he f ur t her 
developm en t of economic measu r e s, i nc lu ding technic ~l assis -
t an ce desi[~e bot h to pr o , te eco no mic pro~re~s ~nd socia l 
We are no re a dy t o subject t h e se aims of the Treaty 
t o the tes' of 8ea to 1 s act u al perf or mance over the years . 
It s econom ic and social a i ms have a rouse d l it tle con tr ver y 
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an-'~ we may d eal ·i th th e se first . 
Economic and Social Matters 
Alt houg h t he a ctu al &mot.n ts sp ent are n..,~ va il ablel9 
the R~port s of the Sea t e An.nu, l MAe.ting s ention 1Jrogr e s of 
progra.ms i'or gr i cultu r e :, c cl€.r a en d malar i ..... co nt rol , te ch -
nical training, met~reo lo · ic al res ea r ch , community de v elopmen t, 
cu .. t · rs.l an' educ at i ona ex chang es , et c. Howeve1~, alo~ _gs ide 
thes9 a ctiviti e s , the Re orts ci te equ ll y , and someti me~ 
mo e , prominently the country - vvi se u.id b .in g r ec eivea by 
the se a rea thr ough su ch U. S.- sup· ort ed pro ject s as the Col ombo 
Pl an , the Technic al Cooperc:.t i on vli s sion , the Mu t u - l Se curi t y 
Progr· m, Exp ort -I mport Bank , the P re r-ide n t I s Fund f or As i an 
conomic Developm ent , the ·g ric u~tur al ra de Develo ment and 
Assistance Program , etc . These'. re ot her i nterna -ion a l agenc ies 
doi ng ec onomic and social assis t an ce wor}r. in t he area . With 
the ex i stence of th ese well- kn it s chemes seriou~ ques t i ons 
a rise a bo t the ··es ir ab i lity of makin J.i a pr i ma rily mil i t a r y 
defense orga ni:cr tion th e mef i um for chan ne lli ng conomi c 
ssist ance f or V{hic h i t c an ne ver be c.deq,ua te ly an d co mpete n tly 
equ i pped . F'or a de t a il ed di sc u ss i on on this point r efer ence 
r B . , 'l t' l Qn :may be made t o Pro:.. ess or ra ib an t1 s exce.1.. . ent a r ic .. e . ;;;,..., 
-1ili t ary Ef fiCci. C:V or Sea to 
'fhe pl easing eup hony of the sou ds eato and Na.to 
not wi ths t a ... d i ng , the two or gan i sation ar e \I\Or ds a·pa.rt i n 
19 .Budget est i mat e..; of q,896, 860 for 1959 - 6 1/lier  reported 
"co·verin g the co • ts of civil 1cmd mi lit a ry headqa.ar ters and 
the previo us p:r·ogrctrus unde rtaken by the Or e,;ani sa.tio~ .fl . 
20 ~ Ralph Bra i ban ti, "The ~out ~east As ia Coll ec tiv e Defens e 
Tr e aty n, P a cific Aff a irs, XXX, Dec ember , 195 7, pp . 3:7.7 - 34 . 
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evgry s i ;n ifi can t sense for increavJn g the milit a y capab i -
J..i t 1 • oJ ~ defense or t~n i s,=. t icn ags.i ns t ext er n al a tt a ck . 
Se Eit.6' s mi li trry inad e,q_uacy s pr in gs _r_.m a mult it ude of 
c· uses . 
J\lth o· gh Seato i s a regi on a .i. or ; anis ,"ti on fo r Southea,,st 
itsifl only three -- Th.;;.iL .nd , Ph i li p ,i nes and Pa}:i s t an -- of' the 
United 1=:.t a tes ,. Br i "-ai n , Fro.nee , New Zea .i. nd and u str alia - -
are ou ts i de rs . 
Th e onl: a i m (J f ,fr . Dul l e s in or gan i sing e s.t o to 
nombat Communis m no+wit hst and i ng , th e et he r c:i bna or .... es to 
the Tr ,ea ty 1 no ta bly Paki s ·,an2 1 , ref used to fee l simi &rly 
c ·ncer ned . Th e United ~t a te s , th e ref or e , had ~a si gn a 
sep a ra t e nun de r s t and.in g rr "h ich "...r.:ould l i mit i ts pa rtici p.stion 
i n Se.s.to only a. a i ns t Co ;nmuni sm with - re a rd to t he " agg re :;; i on 
by means of ar:med a t t ack " pr oviso contatned i n parag ra. .:)h 1 
of Arti cle IV of th e Tre a t y . 
The way P& i s t ~n manip• a ted entry i n to Ceato t hr ows 
int er esting sidel i ght on how sometimes the Uni t eo St a t e s 
has a.J.lov,ed other countri e s ' i n t erest s t o di cta t e 
forei gn pol icy . Duri nb th e r ~· o- Chinese oeak cr i :is pe riod , 
a ft er Mr . r .1.l1es ha d been ask ed by Congre s sion a l l ee:iders to 
' l . ttAs f a r a s PaK ist ;_in i s con c ern _ed•1 , Mr .. Hamidl1 1 liuq 
Chou dh:uy , Pa k i i:t· ... n ' '1 For e l gn },i n i s t e r i,,tts t o exp l a in. 
to the Pak i s t a n Na tio nal Assembl y i n 19 56, " t h e mos t 
notable a ch i eVBf• en t of ~e'° to .is th e reaff ir mat i on by the 
members of our s t and on Kasl i r . nd Dur a.nd in e t\ i th 
L:!:' gho.ni sta n '' . For ~ign Re-l a tions (Ka r a ch i. : Gov e r nment or 
Pa.K.i..,t an , 1956 .}, p . 56 . None of th sse fa l s vei t h i n the 
a i ms of Sea to. 
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. ou nd out otn e r St a tes r eg~rding t1is liroj e ct e" inter v -n ti on 
i n the War, he ade fev eri h effo r ts t• get om \ sian 
c ount ri e s ~l s o to g i ve his 1 ~ns a sembla nce of "united 
acti on ". · a~ i st&n •a s not ·nv ite d . But soo n a1 ist an ra i sed 
a Red car ecrow . Professor Geor ge Model s-: i quotes a Karac hi 
d is patch of Jul y 11, 954 emphasisi 1g HC0•1muni s t su bv ersi onn 
problem Paki..,tan was f .ci ng , particul a rl y in its e;;,ste r n 
wi ng nd pro claimed th a t the 11threa t of a Communis t atta ck 
on t h i s seven - year - ol d co unt r y ••• is not remo t eir2 .... 
Prof e~sor Model. ~ki t hen note s t h over one thou sand al l eg ed 
11Communis ts and f e llo N- travellers" 1-e re rrestect . Pak i s tan ' s 
border with Burma v;as spann ed ic,it h tro9 ps : to guard agai -~s t 
a possib e Comrn· ni s t dri ve t hro ugh Burma an d Thai l c:.nd 11• 
? ak i t an sent her z.,_frul l a.h '.han in Ju ,..,-10 to ~102.st i ng ton to 
sho w 'its inte n tionn to j oi n Seato . I n P 'kin g , on the ot h er 
hand , th e a dstani :..mbassador en t ert a i ned Chou En- 1,, i and 
oth ers over to as ts to P~k ist an 1 dete r i nation t o u rt he r 
develo p 11t he ha py and har monious r elations now subsisting 
bet ween t he t\ ,o countri e s " _;::;3 Professor Mode lski r mar.::rs: 
Pak i s t an joi n d as an a s ·ociate of th e Sea to s t · tes , 
· bu-i- no one be li eve d t n ;J.t fear of Chin a pl aye d a si gn ific an t 
par t i n that dec i s io n . The Communist dange r , sudden y 
pl aye " up in 1954, h a s not been not ic ed s i nce . 24 . 
In the pr oce s s, th e Unite . J t a t es relations ~ith 
In di a , Afg han i stan , and Burma., in par tic ul a r , and wi t h the 
loc . cit. 
24 . ~ loc . cit . 
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oth er . tates o f th e r eg i on rea ec ed a lo ~ ebb . 
ome ob server;:, hav e even f elt t ha t th e eme gen ce 
of ~ha t is c " l ed the "Asian - f ric an ° blo c , as u sepmrat e 
ent ity can be tr a c ed dir ec tl y t o t h e cre &tion of Seat o: 
I n th e i gh t 0 1 a l l that h as ha_pe ned s i nce lv54 , 
one of tbe most int er e s tin ,:;; as_ cts of Sc. to is h nt i n 
r a c ice it marked t he beg i nn i ng of a nev, ph ase i n t ;·;e 
pa t tern of b eh avior of t h e u.nco, mi tt0.d . Aft e r that ummer 
the i dea of bipol f rity beg an t o lose its ri p . I ns t ea d of 
t h e reel i ng of i n cr eas i ng compulsi on t o jo in one sid e or 
the other in th L- cold v·ar , a more fl ex i bl e i nternat i onal 
or der began t o appea r . ~5 · 
It was on l y af t er Seato ' s b irth , 1:1gai n , that t he 
Afghan gov ernmen t s t a rted ge t t i nb Sovie t t echni ci - ns and 
mil it a ry hel p and the Chi nese Coffirlunist st~rted rev am~ing 
th e Cacibodian army . 
Th t th e As i an par t ne r are i n no positio n to add t o 
Seato 1 s tr eng t h ma t eria l l y i s admi t ted b th emse l v e~ . I n 
any case , the y a r e f rank r.bo ut it : 
The ot her da y the Pri me x i niste r of Pak i s t a· ... , de scri bi ng 
th e Ba hdad. Pa ct , us ct rath er s trL in g lc1.ngu::ig e .. He sa id : 
zero plu s zero plus zero pl s ·-ero equal s zer o . His poi n t 
was tr at unl e ss . ome powerf , l count r y li ke the United : i ng -
dom or th e Uni te d St a tes wcs i n th 0 Bag h tad · a ct with i ts 
b i g mi l it 1'.iry ap p-ra t· •s , a ll th e ot he r• members of it, f r6 m 
th e 1-oi n t of vi e · of armamen t, were r el a tiv e l y zer J "There 
i s ar,.other aspe ct of' i t. When a co un tr y considE-!r i ng i ts el f 
zero att a ch es it sel f t some Jig-gre , it i s th e fi gure t ha t 
counts, n ot the zero , obv io u sly . ~6 
It ne ed s h · rdly to b e ddde th a + i n the Laoti a~ cri-i s 
sent 
of 1.; 61 , v:h~n ot h er members of Sea. t'o / to ke n forc e s i n sup; 1or t 
of t he Unit ed t ~t es de c 4 s i on to lard m·r i ne s in Tha l l n1 , only 
25 . Goo d- Ad~ms , ~ ci t , p .1 41 . 
~6 . Ja waha na.l Ne-hr-u, I ndia ' s Forei gn ~ o l icJ, S"'lect ed s pe e ch es , 
1..,53 - 57 ( Delh i: Pub ic a.ti ons Divisi on , 1958 ) , p . 36 4 . 
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Paki t~n excuse d herself . By tds t i me, Pakis, · n had• first -
class &rmy, t rtanks to hlT!erican arms , b·.1t then she 1a.:: become 
an American ally not because of her anti - Commu.nisin. 
A so much 1 t:: s never expec i..ed of' Australia , .Britain , 
France or New Zealan d by way 01 act ua l contr ibut ion to Seato ' s 
milit ary stren gt h . Their sa tisf " ct i on v:i th Se a to an d their 
rea sons for joinin g it ~ou ld a ppear to be base d on th e con -
s i dera ti on that th e Unit ed States , for th. f irst ti me in her 
history , acc epted military co mmit ments i n th e area and , there b"", 
underwrot e their own i nt erests th er e . Australia a nd New Ze a ltnd 
were al .~eady covere d by the nzus Pa ct , but the ttAustra li an 
ov-ernment has repea t edly insiste d t ha t i f it shou d be come 
neces .sary to f i gh t to _ rot e ct Australia , it i much better 
t do t h e fightin g in ne i 5bb or in, countri e s t han i n our ov.n11 7. 
A- str a li a ' s Defense Min i ster , Sir ?h i i : J cBr ide::, said t h is 
i n so . any word ·s . With refer ence to Au tralia I S _a.to membi:>r-
shi i, he st a te d tha t it was import rn t lfto maintai n tre O'ap 
bet ween Austr a l i a ar d the present high\1a t er m;Rrk of' the 
ou..1.,h' ard .fl ow of Communism " and th&t us r a,l ia must 11hold 
the Communists at th e f ·- rt he st 1,oint adv-ant .:.• eo, s -i-o us and · ,. 
we :must consol i date ou r stre r g th th ere as e;u5 .. c l ly as pcs:ibletr :88 
( emphasi s su ppli ed) . ·1r : hili p of course c • nnot bl e.Jne hi s 
northern nei ghb ors if they show no 0 re a t en th us ia sm f or hi s 
resolution . 
~7 . Macmahon Bb.ll , op . c i t ., p .1 9 
;;;:.8. -uoted in Modelsk i, op . cit ., p ,.7 8 
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USA: The Ki gp i n of Sea te 
It i. s obvi ous that any mi l it ary effect iv eness whi ch 
Seato may pos sess a t any t i me dep ends on t he attitude of the 
United Sts t es . How does America lo ok at h er commi t ments to 
Sea to? On J une 
conf erence : 
1956 the ~ecre t ary o f St a te to ld a ) ress 
I th i nk yo u Kno w i.:hat c er t a i nly a ll th e trea t y member s 
knov;-- tho t i t was · greed and t h~ t i t v.a s unders t ood f r o,., 
the very beg i nn i ng tha t we v,ould not a t temp t t o est :.:.b.i i sh 
a f orc e - i n - be i ng t o . ~ea·o comn&rab e" to th€ f o~ce• i n- be~ng 
which i s as si gned. t o 1Iato . 1 ·e h v e t o dep~nci prim' •.rily 
u pon Qn approp ri at e cooper &t io n of lo c&l fo1 c es - i - bei ng 
wi t h ~he mobil e s tri k i ng po• er of t he Un i ted States ~hi ch 
i s avai l able i n th t este r n Pa ci f ic a nd whi ch i s av~i l ab _e 
to be used wheneve r i t nee ~s t o be ~sed" . 28 
Tha t •1akes i t cl e , r t h ,....,.t so f a r as the Uni ed St a t es 
i s c onc er ed , Mr. Dul l es ·ou l d rel y so l el y on her 11mass iv e 11, 
r i rb orne nJclear ret a li a t i on and expec t the "loc -1 forces - in -
be i ng" t o SU\1ply t he AsiG.n manpower t o 11fight th e Asians ". 
Tha t Mr . Th~l es i ntended U. S. v~rtic i p~t i on in Seato 
defe_ se on ly i n c --se of a th ir d · 'o r l d War becom e s fu rther 
ob vi ous , re • d i n g h is above s t a eaient al on g v,ith the f o-'-lovdn g : 
Tha t does not mean turn i n5 every l ocal war i nto a 
a world ~~r . I t does no t mean that i f th r e i s a Commmni st 
a tta ck ome,he r e i n As i a , a tom or hydro ~en bombs ~ill 
ne c ess r-i l~ be dr opped on th e great industries of Cl""ina 
or Russ i a.00 
However, ba ck i n 1 .54 li t t e di d Mr . D 1 es r ea l i e 
tha t the r i s i ng So vi et mi gh t t;ould soon m· k h is nr o llb a c1 tr 
29 . . s . De ,Jartme n t of St &:t-·e Bul letin , J un e ;;:5 , 1956 . 
-zo. " .. ol icy fo r P-"'&c e and Secur i ty 11, Fo e· ~ff ~i rs , la c. c it. 
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strat egy obsol ete an d ~oul d le ve him inc apab. e o~ fi chting 
any other ~ars excep t local , conve ntion al ~Ars fo r 1hi cb he 
vtas not pre pa re - • Let us see ho, .·e at o has workea. i n actual 
pn. .. c tice . 
SEATO I n Acttio x~ 
I t i s claim ed to Se .to ' s cre dit tha t no overt Cci.~~unist 
aggre s sion ha s occurred i n the Tre a t y ureas s i nce 'its ince,....-
tion . 1.;ince none of t h e member state s ha."" territor·i es conti -
guous to the Communist st ate s> the qu esti on of aggress ion 
against them can arise on.y vicario us ly. ~he situat i on in t h e 
11desi - natedn areas of Vi etnam , Laos nd Cambodia ha s co ~ti -
nu ed a s it existed at the time Seato ca me or1 the sce ne . 
C· mbodia has firm.ly ad he red to neu t rality which ha s pe rh 3ps 
survived because of h er stub b orn r efu..;a.l to let Sea to nprotectf 1 
her .• Fight i n g i n Vietnam h as spre~d much fur he r South . Th e 
Cc..tSe 01 Laos i s hig.1ly ill us tr " tive of Sea to ' s i ne ffective ;.es s . 
The ne a rest thi ng to a hostile Communist move was -cr-ie 
North Viet amese complicity i n the Pathet Lao rebel ion 
to v.ards th e closing of l., 59 . L t h o se n ili t s.ry skirm · shes 
the Uni te d ' ta t s e_;cour agec a cti on t h ro L gh th e 'n i te d T a +ions 
and the 11.Seato conferee ~ di scu se - the possibil.ity of f i nding 
ways ,nd mea ns to ma i n t a i n a Un ited Ka tions ' presence ' in 
Laos ltho c1gh no form - 1 state ments were me.de , it is 
1m own th a t Sea to members su b s e ~uen tly used the ir i nf uence 
in New York t o furthe r this ide& in pra.cti ~f1l way s 11• 7.1 
2n. Nor man J . Pad e.11.brd , 110e a t o and Pea ce i n 80 1 t h.east ,t";.sia11, 
Curre nt His t ory , XXX:XVIII , ,Febru a ry , 1960, p . 98 . 
Prof ssor p~ · ~ for d further remarks : 
The .mi d action by ' ea to is no t a!, e; .,..or the Laotii:..n 
situation a ea.red of f hand to inv.-olve the : i nd of thr ea t 
to peace ~nd se cur ity ,hich t he Southea t ·s ia Col le ctive 
Defence Treaty was desi gned to meet . 32 
Sea to ' s t his i nac ti on in t he face of en oo vi ous 
Communist ggression makes it cle ar tn ~t the ~r and stra t egem 
of "mas ive ret al iation" was a mere t~lk and ~as i mpot en t t o 
dea l v.it h situations i n vh ich 11nuclear ar..c.: ai r - borne pov:er 11 
~ere not po ssib e to dep lo y . 
Subversion: Sea to ' s Qi ghtmare 
Hor,ever , t contin u e to consider Seato 1 s ro.le .,,1t h 
referenc e ··o :. nned Communist t ~a c.K on · y is to i gn.o:-e t E. 
actu.:.l realities of the situ at ion i n Southe a st Asia . Even 
b.efore Se:... to w· ... s cr ec~t ed a change in Communis t t chniques 
from open conflict t o sub ros metho d s v.- ~, discernible as 
ear.,.Ly a.S 1951 • .The Sea. to Cou .cil at i t · s econc. ann:.10.l .meetin 
noted : 
• • • · •,e c. re fa ced with the unrelent i ng e m1-aign 
aga i nst our v.ays of life thc:tt intern at ion al commun ism 
i s 1agin .c- ••. At d if f e re 1t times , i va r i oJ.: l aces , 
we see insurr r.,ct io n , terror .is:n, yoli tic f~.1 _ r~ssure ,1-1d 
pro pa 0 an a , unde r gr ounci subversion and lo a.::.ed offe rs 
of economic ccope r a in , attem pts to pervert and ex loit 
the natural aspirations of free peep es to ~ard~ econom ic 
and soc i a l be t te r men t ... • ~ubve r sio1, 11hi cb h s a1. ,.:a.:irs 
been a major problem , i s the m~i n hr ea ~e no= fa c e . 3 
I s Seate e1~ i p1 ed to meet such & c ~ll eng e? The 
Tre at revisi ons d,eal i na v,i th uany si t ua.ti on or fa ct' h e ve 
beeL st a t ed ear lier with ref eren c e o which one ·:d t "' 
33 . Seate : Second Annua l Repor t , p . 13. 
re port ec to Lave r emar 1 ed tha t th ese r ead like Lie actu al 
s i t u a tion in Southeast Asia and it vas ,rpr i sing t· t Seu t o 
h~d. no t been i n co nt inuous sess i on . 
The ci.uest i on o f sub ve r io n br i s tl es \-,i t h t Lor ny 
probl e s . Walt er Lip r-imann even ch ' rged tha. t <:..'e;cc,to is rtthe 
f i rst f orroa in tr umen t i n modern tim es which is de s i gne d t o 
lice n se i n t e r n·tlonal i nterve n t i on i n i n t er na l af f a i r s ' .7-4 
I t must be cle a rly u nd ersto od t hat th e ,~ep<,rate tt -nd erst and ing 11 
si ned by ,[r . Dulles a ppl · es on· y to Tr overt Commurist agg raisionn . 
"'o far as su bve r s i on is con cer ned , t he Uni ed t a t es obli 6&.-
t i on t o "co nsul t i m~ed iate y , i t h other Pa r i e s in order to 
agree on the ffi(:!- sures which sh o ul bs t ak n fo r th e comi1on 
ctefen se n ·ncter P ;: ... ragraph """ of Artic l e I V, is ot t hus li mit ed . 
In t h e ca.se o f <S.n open a t t ck f r om the outs i e it ma.,r 
be comp·rativ ly ea'-"y t o i d en if y the agg r essor , althoug h 
occc1.s\ona ly it i s not so e2..sy . Bu-c, hov, and , ·h is to ae cide 
.hethe r or not s.n in t ernal rebe l l i on i s Communi s t- ·ns pi re d 
and i s no t a gen J inely n • tio na li s t expr e s ion o t popul ar 
dis conten t ? Profes s or Ball ha s parodied t he i dea thus : 1 Is i t 
to be ass umed hat a~l su bve r s ive a ctivitie s are ' dir ected 
f r om ··it hout 1 ? 11, he asks an then points ou t th t 11if t he 
v,o rd sub ver s i on h s any mea:rin ;; it ~-.,a s ur el y t he e t· od 
by .bi ch the st t v'o regimes in Tha iL nd came to power . 
Bu i t wa3 ha r ~Y ' dir ec t ed. rom a,i thou t ' ; it has ot af fec t ed 
'rhai and ' s terri t orial i nt9g rit y and ha 6 1 ven Thailand some 
_4 . 'U.o ted i n Bra.iba nt i , 9-l.!. cit ., p . 7 ·5~· 
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years o_ compar-t ive st "1 ility 1 . l5 Tha t ra i ses th~ question : 
Ho ~ f a r is i t ri ght to allo ? Americ an rms +o be us ed by 
autocratic r e;;,,imes i t hese 1 Q.'._ fa cto ci.epen 1 en ci ,s n' .(,6 to 
mai nt hi n the ir "compar ati ve et bi lity 1 by su.£re s sin ~ 
le gitim a te l ocal griev ~nc e s? 
d ore over , it is diff ic u lt to see ho w suc h subterr nean 
perme a tio n of Communi s t i ·1f.1uen ce can o~ dctmmed w.it ou t 
outl o.wi ng CommuL i s t p~ rties a ll over th e r gion and foL C'tdng 
it u p b f u rt he r Sea.to act-· on , v.he,wer n,e:.c es c1,ry, vdthin t, _e 
t er r it or i a l precinct s of 11prot ect ed " st a t e s . i:>u ch a ct:i. on 
wo u ct c ert a i n l y o~ en f loo dga te s o f int ern a tio nc.. criticism 
dubbing Ssa to a cti ons a s V:'E:" tern I mperi a is1r, , p;;.rtic ul arly 
in a sens itive • r ea where pa st memor i es ar e s ti l l "'O f re sh . 
"The f act is that 11, a s u d •iin F . StG.nto n , ex- U. S . A."Ilbas ado r 
t o Tha.i L:.n obs erves , "a. -sist ance f'r o., o t h er- cou n t r.:.es is n ot 
the a ~S ' er t o s b v e rsi v e f..C .i vi ties w · t t~i n a coun~ ry; sub -
v er ion ca .1 on y be ef fe e t i ve ly countered b the gover n..11ent 
and the people ac tin g in uni so n° . 37 
Tha t pre ci se l y is not ,ha t Sea.to i s eq_ui _pped to 
c:1cl i eve . · r . Dulles ' OV· rr el i an c e on ma s"'i ve u i lit a ry mean s , 
by its very obses sio n, pr ec 'u ed wor k i ng t it h t~e p- o ple to 
bui.ld slovr , democra tic resi t ence to Commur, · sm. He saw onl y 
t he t eet h in Com.munis m.1 s o ;;, en j aw .h ie ~ m&de it i mpos..,i b~ e 
f o r h i m t o re a lise tha t the .eds c &..n -vii n by smiles aS ·wel ..._ 
26 . 1.acma ho n Ball , oo. cit ., 
na . J ~ es Ki ng ,J r ~ -~es t his des cri ption f or South Kore a , Formcs 
and o~ th Viet nam , op . cit ., p . 1 31 . 
't 'r . Edwi n F • .;t anton , nco mmuni s t Pr e ssures in Th c1.i L. 1ndlf , Cu rre n t 
H" s tor.v , XX.XVI I I , February, 1 6 . 
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as s ca re by the i r sco ~l· . 
Tha t th e o t hea st si a Tr eat y 0r ga.r..1 sci.tion v,~ s to 
pro v e o t ot a l l y in a d ~qu a te to its t a sKs h a.:· be n due as 
much to th e realit i e s of So J th er n Asia a . to its def ects 
at con cept i on . I n the ¼ord s of P~ofessor Hans . J .Mor l en t ha : 
It [Sea t o] was i n.te nde d a s a gestu r e of d efi anc E:, ~s 
as an a ct 1r h i ch would con vey initiat i ve and tr eng th 
,,-here actu:...l ini ti ati v e and. s ren 6th <.e.re l a cxin g . As su ch , 
e~ t o ·;a s s ted to t aAe its pl a ce i n th a t series of pre -
tentious , yet ho l lo½, prono ·nceme n ts -,.,h ich r~ nge f ro m 
liber a tion and t he un ea.s· in g of Chi ang I · i - sh ek t hro ugh 
a gon i in g re : pr a isal and the t.tnew loo.K 11 +-o the b rin · of 
;ar ,8 . 
38 . 11 1il' t ar-y I l 1.sionsu, he New Re., ~b_ ic , CXXXIV, Ma r ch 
19 , 1956 . 
V. vOliCLU I O S 
Southern Asia saw itself rece i ving mor e attention 
dur · ng the -~i rst two yectrS of the Ei serlhoVl'e r Admini str<,4,.,: on 
t han any oth er previous ., er~c,n goverfilllen t had ev~r cnr .d 
to be stov 'i on it . This new concern, hov1ever , grew out of 
policies and circum$t an ces w1.ich unhap pily le d +o under-1-a-
k in gs tha t ~ere n i sconc lve d as we l as inef fe c ·,ive . On 
b~lance , the nite d Sta e Jolicies p~eared t o ha ve been 
for the emer,.,e nce of a str ong mis t r1 s t 
.American ains in the c;l. ea wit hout any cou n.t erv lling 
ac i.evem en ts . 
The sources of ' this mis conce ption and the atte nd 1: 1'.rt 
ineffectiv enes~ of poli ci e s were man ifold; but , in the 
final analy.:,is , t hey spra ng f r om the bas ic 1os t ula ta s of 
the po itic al p .ilosophy of c ertain po :e rf ul elements in 
the Repub ic an echelons whi ch , de to a fortutiou.s combi -
nation of goo d luck and parti an man~ ul ati on of popular 
s ·scep ti bi ities; ca.me to t he or e to v,' r ds th e eno. o th e 
Truman Adm·1 n istr -ti on . 
Thes e gr oups have sometimes been , soi- di s • nt, ca lle d 
11 i -sol at io n i ~ts II in i n terna tiona.l politic"' , \ hen act a lly 
they merely w.:i.shed to keep a lo of from the dissi pati.ng inter ne-
cin trug ~les of the po~erful Eur ope an cou ntries . At other 
ti mes , they have se lecte the mor e a ttr ac tiv e n ,.J'Ile of 
& · e ric a - Fir t ers , then in fa ct they were l oo~ i g Westw ar d t o 
Asia ~ mcirke ts a cro ss he Pacific . 
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However, by the ti me t he Uni te ,. Sta t . s c ul d arrive 
a t the Asia n sce ne , Chi na alone h-:.d esca ped from fa lli ng 
under ur o ... e an dominanc e . Bu t Chi na ,ias a large , s prav ,li ·~g 
coun t ry and promise d to be pot en ti ally th e big est marke t 
i n the hOr d . · he ur e for tr ade •as i ven as iri t ua li st 
an d ~ellf a r ist dimension v~en re li gious gt oups of v •rious 
d nomi n~tions sou gh t t o win th e mill i ons for Christ . A 
~e i rd com~oun d of r cial supe rio r it y , money, and morals 
made China ' s mystic a l pull the loadst a r i n the ~2 st ward 
fl i gh t of the e&gle . 
1t h t his back gro und of mat erial and emotio nal 
i n vo vement it va s not s r ·)r is i ng that ,;,i th t he a ll of a 
Hfrien d a_ d a ll y 11, Chia ng ai - sh ek , i n 1949 , this grou t s 
excessive sense of fr us tr ~ti on over Ch in ' s loss to t1e 
Comm~nists fo und exa gger a t ed expre sion in a vi t upe r a t i ve 
and full - t hr oat ed cry aga in st t he Truman .t..dmi nistr · tio n . 
The s t alema t ed · ore a:r.. t7ar supp lie d further f el to 
1i de l y he l d ill us i ons of il_ffierican superiority and i n vinci -
bility . Had Herbert Hoover as serte d for nothin g t h21.t nth e 
pot en tL ... l ·tre mg t h of thi n tio n i s the st cngest t hing in 
t he ,ho le wor ld . • • • ,merica can.n.ot be defea ted 11? T h e 
11Asia - Fir.:3 t ersn or 11 s ia l a tio ni st s:1 , a s .... h ey have be en 
call ed , charged tha t it was the Tr uman- Acheson r olic y of 
11::..oftne ss" t ohard s Commu is m .hic b had ns t.1bstitutedt 1 r.J.··o 
f or Ch ian g , had 11i nv itectn th e aggr e ssion. i n Kor ea , and hen 
fo gh t it "waster - l y n wit h unn ce s s ry cost in 1illleri c an 
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l ives i n ctn .Asian v,a r . It v;a.s no ,.,hii:1g sho rt ot· the Democr ats ' 
" def e .::.oti s m a n d · a fness to -,ards . .t.sia f ro m Pr esi de: ... CJl dov nn, 
t hey ann oun ced f r om pu lpi vs a.nu hou s eto ps , v,hi c·~ "i:l. S r e sr o ,-
s i b e for- America ' s shauH? u "ar ch f ai l ures 11 i .1 Cr-in.a a n d 
Korea. 
i)plyi ng t he same art is an lo gic to t h e other area s 
of United Sta tes for e i gn af fa ir s , the y had no diffic ul t y i n 
bla mi ng the 11too ti mi d and immora l" conce pt of ncont a i ranen t" 
for the en sla vement of E&st Europ ·n peop l e by th e Sovie .s . 
r -u.man po lici e s tr;e re tt tr eaci.mill policiesH , they i v ej_ghed , 
h ich were a im ed a t slo vc"' y "sa pp in II the 1a ti on 1 s v1t ~1s . 
America , t he r i cne ~t and t he mi gh ti es t nat i on i n the ¼or l d, 
u.id not 11.&ve to suff er t he torment of i mpoten tl y 0 li v i ng 
foreve r ' 1th the Red per il . And so on . Thro u~h a series of 
c a ref u l ly planned and wi c.ely 1,,ublicize d i n q .ests on the 
nco mmuni t - i nfes tedr r Sta, te Depa rtm en t tlL Re pubiic ans whi pp ed 
u p enough mas s hys t eri a to ma.ke th e ir char ge,. accept a ble to 
t he :u blic a t l " r g e . Th ey t a ilore i t' eir 1952 Pre s ident ia l 
election pL:.t f crrn. al so mainly with an eye on thi s po pular 
mood . 
I n Jo hn Fost er Du ll es they f ound a nev;! Messiah vmo 
best a.r ti cul a ted the ~epubl i c an par~ i. :ii:!. ship i r. forei.oo 
~olicy. Altno ug 1 he had been i n ti mately associated in hig h 
c ap a cities r i th t he ad.mi nis tr ~ t i on of Democro. tic for, ~i gn 
polici 0 s , •r . Du l es f ound t.he prosp e ct of a c ommnndiI1g 
pon i ti on i n a Rep ublic n Ad.-rni istr a ti on too t a.nt c.lisi ng to 
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r es tr i n h i .in hi cri ti cis m of Truman olici e s . He de cl ared 
tha t Ameri ca ' s "massive retaliator y mi gh ta cou l d &Ot "nly 
trcte t e r H a ,-:ould - be Commun i st agg re ss or , but c o l d 11roll him 
ba ck 1 as aff ec tivel y . He wen t a step furth-r &nd , ~1th an 
e§.r to th e t r ad ition al con c e r n of bu sines"' ·• i th t axation , 
·)ro mise d to van quish t h e \ e f o e at a ''mu ch r E, ·uced c ·tr 1 , 
lower t ha the Democrats ' on uns u cces" ,fu l "cont .i nment 11• He 
res u rrected the image of ·· , eri c an o ni pot ence il 1 a yzay whi ch 
any ma t er of demagogy woul d envy : Wit h reg ard to the ,e op.le 
beh i nd t he iron and bamboo curt ains , he a ss e rted , meriea 
mus+- make it cle ~r t h at Hit v:· n ts and expects iiber · tion to 
oc cur 11, ari d t l ese cu rt a i n s woul d ..,hat ter i n an n e l ectrifying 
w a.·,r!f lifti rf' the Com.mu .i st yoke . 
' ., , 0 
Vlhe he r t he Repub l icans would su cc eed in nro l i n g ba ck" 
th e Communi s ts v,as as yet to be seen , but t h y did su ccezd 
i n rollin g the Democrats out o f the Wh it e House . av i n ·; r i d,de n 
to vict ory on the crest of th e curren t popu l i:tr w;:,;v e, th.Hy 
had o-w to r econ cil e th e mut ually i n compa tible aims of nm.ore 
secur i ty a t l e s s cos t " i nto a prog r am of acti on . They wove 
t oge th i::ir their "concernH for Asia , promi .s e s of t x re duc ti on , 
Dullesi an Hbol dli t a lk, · nd a brand ,q, e-w Loo t..:11 on str a t eg r 
f or mi d- cent ur y Ameri c a emer ged . 
Th e basic t h i nk i n g behin ·1 this strate gy can be 
summari sed s fol .lows : I n .or er to prev ent Ameri ca ' s Vit a ·ty 
ba ed on pr i va te enter pr i s e from slowly erodmg t h ro ug h hu g e 
gover ment sp en di ng , eco nomi es .:.iust be eff ected . Qin 8 e 11the 
oi g spen d i ng is, of cou rse, the ,'\60 bil lion we p y for 
s ecurity' , the , epublican Pr e ' i dential ce:.nc.i da t e had ex -
pla i ned. i n a spee ch L Bal ti more on Sei t ember f5 , 195r:· , 
11h ere is wnere the largest s vi. gs can be maderr . But i f th e 
threat of Communism had to be 11d.estroyedH , maint enan ce of 
adequa te mil itdry po~er was als o essent i a l . The on l y way to 
rec on cil e t he se tw o op po s i ng urges ~as t o do some ret h in k in g 
on de fense str a t. gy . 
~ 
AS far as Eur ope -.:as co ncerned , it v-:as de ci ded tha t 
it 1ad re ceive a dis pr opor t i ona te sh a re of atte nt i on fro m 
t he Democr a tic n· u ro pe - Fir s ter s" . Oth er "areas near r to the 
Communi s t agg ressors 11 wou1 · now b e m1::.de cit ade l s of the fre e 
~orld f s defense . Comm n ist China h a d mos t rece n t ly i n c·rred 
t he wr a t h of the Americ an pe ople . Besides , she ~-·a. wea • By 
co nc ent r ' t in g :;;opul ar a t ten ti on on he r _it was possi b l e t o 
se r ve God and Mammen a t t l ,- same time •. · oreov er , i t , as 
poss i ble to f i nd che : per Asian =· l i es , and sharing th a co s ts 
wit h th em, the whol e pro r t.m could be mad e Hbea r a bl eu . 
Th i S,ia 1·i ng o r"' th e costs was e asy. ThP. United States 
a lrea dy had an ov er\ he l mi ng superiority i n nu c lear st ocKpi .les 
ana a i r and na va l st rik i ng c~pa city . It coul d supp l y t h is 
com.,onent to the al li n ee system wit hou t much addit i o~al 
cos t. I n f'ac t, th i s woul d prev en t i ndu trial l ay offs and 
u sb.pp i n ,. tt of Americctn pr os peri ty . The waste occ 1),rr d mai nl y 
in ma i nte:.!..ining Ameri ca n m-ri ne an d gro und f orc e s . It co ~t 
as much 
five times / to kee p an Amer ican i n unifor m ras it did -
to maint a in ?aKis t an i sol di e r. The man pove r of t h e Asi an 
8 J 
a l i es , oul d not onl y be cheaper but : ou · m2 K · it po s ible 
' to let As i an fi r,h t Asi an~· n . 
Mili t a r y a l l i ances thu be came t he cornerstone o.t:'•tr.e 
11 
,e· · Look 11 ··t ra .te y . To t hi s •:as a ddea t h e a.nt_ - C mm ·n ist 
messi ~nism and " bol d polic i e- 8 of Sec r e t ary D l l es . These t wo 
in combin at io n pr oduced a sit ua t i on m1 ch like a c r u sad e in 
1,'h ic h anybody who did no is'i sh to j o i n somehov,· a cked in 
moral _pro i ty . Probl ems of econom ic and social bettermen t 
a cquire ~ se co ndary . l ace , no t only becau s e a preoncup a ti on 
11ith them d -f l ec t ed fr om the pe opl e ' an ti - Com unist zeal bu t 
their solut i on Vsoul d c".u e budgetar, str a in s D 
It iras ;,i th th i s policy mix . t ha t t he Eisenhov ,e r 
hdmin i-t r at ion looke d a t the ~trat eg ic re g i n of Sou~hern 
' sia . Al mo.t a l l the count r ies in t h a t re gi on haa. re c ent l y 
emer ed from for eign domi nat io n , ~nd nut ura l ly vie we· th ei r 
ne wly - ~on freedom ;:,s he ir r:iost pre cious a..:se·L,o Be c aust of 
tll ,,i r so r ecen t ex~eri ence th ey ooke d 9 t a.11y fore i moves 
i n th e a ra a with mis g ivin~s. They were mor e concerned vi th 
the bas ic problems of _conomic , socia ~ and politic a l chan ges 
1hich had b een ar tificially a rrested d rin g c enturi e s of 
forei gn control than wi th t he i de olo ica l ~in 1i lls . I ~~ s 
not tha t actors in t hi s int 0 rn at io na sub - sy<-:.tem ie re 
obl, viou~ l of t :ie col d ,•,ar t ens io ns , bu t · o th em tne on y 
e.f:fective \ay t o resist un d esirable extern a l pressures 
appeared to de. end on tle satisf a ctory sol · ti n ·of thes e 
pr obl ems of basic ch ange . Thus the Re_i.iubli ca.n .Administr a t i on ' s 
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concern and th e Southern Asian eo ple ' s concer ns ran 
tang e -ift:ia.lly again -t each othe r . 
Tl e f i rs-t majo r manife..,t a tio n of the ?!Nev: L'"'okn i n 
this reg i on occ u rrea in t he - shape of a mi lit a r y a l l i ance 
v·i th t ak i s t an . The nee d for a r m. aid to P ~ k i st b.n ha.d ar i s en 
d ir ec t --'-y f ro m th e de c l i ne o+> the Br iti h Empire. Earl i er 
Brit a i n ' s I naia - ba se d power had controll ed th 8 s tr~t eg i c 
Mid dl e ~ast arc ·enc ompa s~i ng the r ic h oilfi e- ds . The rise 
of r ctb n ° t i onalism and India ' s r efusa l to let h er s elf be 
use f or Br it a i n ' s i mper i a l i nt eres t s n ece ssitate d ne ~ 
sys t em of defense f or this a r ea . That ·is wher e Pa Ki st ~"1 came 
i n t o t he pic ture . , Br i ta i n had been anxio ~s to per su ade t he 
Uni ted t a t es +0 share Mid c le .t.aste r n oil ,mrrie s. But , 
ma.ki ng no headv-;ay ~~i t h th e Truman ~-dmL_istration , whi ch 
app eared to ha ve appre ci a t ed the polltic a r eper cus sio n s of 
milit ary al li &nce Y1i th Pakist - n on th e nat i ona l f orces in 
Sou t hern sia an d t h e Midd le ~ast , the Bri t i sh qu i etl y 
s t a r ted '..ork i ng t h ro ugh t he · ent agon . But n ~thi ng came ou t 
of thi s til l Mr. Dull e s too over th e St a t e .e artme nt . 
l ithin months af t er t ha t the qu est i on of ar m s~ppl y ~o 
Pak i st an a c uire d ne Tu ur gency an , on May ·19 , 1954 Pakistan 
became the first U. S. mili t&ry all y in Sou t hern Asia . 
'Th e HiJew I.,ook11 then turned to I n.do - Chi n . •:here 
another imperial ,. o· ·er , this t ime th e tott e rin g re gi me of 
franc-e , v' s fi gh tin 6 a l st - di t ch b tt l.e agains t the Commu-
nis t n a ti onnl for c es . It .as in response ~o t h e Fr en ch di ·t r ess 
and the possibi i ty of China ' .. int e rv en ti on on b eha lf of 
• < U , 
the Co.an ni t insurg en t th .:i t Jr . Du ..... les tr· .n s ated his 
s tr at;eg of nuclear su periority into a nctoctrine 11 of inst ant 
massive ret aliat i onrr . le offered t Vio atom bombs to the 
Frenc h und moved units of t _e S venth Fl et f o r a . ollo ir- up 
a ir-st ri e . imul ta ne ousl y , he announ c ed t h a t th P..mericu 
action ~oul d not be con fin ed to I ndo - China b~t ~oul embr a ce 
the 11base s of a.g ressionrt in the Chinese ho , ela id . Wh en h is 
Army Chief or Jtaff CctUtioned that the a ir - strike iou l d 
i mm diately requ i res ~por t f'rorn American. grouna f orces , 
M.r. vu les r lented. rnerican l iv es were to o precio u s to be 
ho gea -~o :n L the jun g le s of Indo - Chinc., so soon af ter he 
t orean experJence . Con ress ·would not counten --nc e this . The 
-·mol e thing "ou ld be too expensive an prepos t erous . 'fhe 
British , lo had called a confer enc e on I ndo - Chi na , woul 
not ~o ,.alon g an allow the i r ef fo rts to be sti - 1-born. 
Thus chec1-an~t ed , 0ecre t ar Du_les fe 1 bac~ on the 
s e con d- rate trategy of · "post· re of s tr en gth" . Throu gh 
calcu_ a te d leaK s he kept u,. th e 11deterr en ce 11 of some con te mp-
lated Americ "n a ction if Geneva did no t pr oduce v,ha t, 
Mr . ".!.isenho v,er had sc.:.id, ttwe could at l e ast ca.11 a moo.' s 
v i vendi" . But Dulles 'hould n t sit with the hat ed Chin ese 
Com, unists a t the same confer en ce t able . And ;Yh en the 
Conference rodu c ed an e4 reement sati f ct ory to al · the 
yart·es concerned, he felt a loost deser t ed and ~uld &Ot 
l et America b a sign& t ory to he "han di ng overtt of a 
, 
t erI'ito r·y to Communi"m. 
Througho 1 ·1t t h e Geneva Confe r en c e Mr . Du .... es mai ntained 
t e econa t hreat of collective action in I i do- China . He had 
in fa c t already invited the milit a ry re prese n t a t iv es fro a 
f ew ccun t ri es for eonsu- t at i ons . Ai't er the Gen.ev· ac cords 
~er e s i gn ed he insi-ted t h~ t a We stern i ni t i a te d collective 
de f ense should be org anise c. to underwrite them . Hurried i nvi -
t at i ons v;ere iss ed t o whoever wanted to ,join . Three coun -
tr i es from the reg i on an fi ve out~ i ders met in xlani l a in 
'e~ tember , 1954 and the Southeast Asia Tre a ty Or gan i · a ti cn 
came in t o be i ng . 
'I'hi ,:) organ i sa t i .on , de pi te Dull es ' tou gh talk in 
t he precedin - months , pr oveu t o be th e most ineffe cti ve 
collecti ve defense un er t aking ever pro"uced. by -such powerful 
ba ckers . No ·¥vonder , Sea to h&.s been dubb 0 d as a 11mi sbego t ten 
paper tig e r" , "mi lit a ril y ho l l ow", and 1~oliti cally pernic i ous" . 
I n the i r i n i scriminate se~ ·c fo r all i es the 
Dulles i an i ncongruit i e s of t!mor e s ecuri t y at l ess cos t 11 
· t tra. ct ed dispa r·a t e br::,d- bell o ii s i n Southe r n Asi a who showed 
l it tle agreement viith t he Ame ric a1 con c ern about Com.nr:1nisrn. 
Pak i stan was op enly say 1ng , ev en before .the i gn i ng of t t e 
a1l i c.nce agreeme nts wi th the Unite d States , th a t- it s on.Ly 
aim ,a s t o s t rengthen it se f a ains t i ts nei ghb ors : In ia. 
and Afghanistan ; India , i n paTticula.r . The.ilan -d has been 
s i mi l a r y more concerned vd th Cambod i a ar ... d B rm: tha n l'.i t h 
Co_l uni st China , an at on time it s ambas ad or i n Was 1ington 
84 
went so f a.r as to eq· at it memb ers h i p of Seato ~it h i ts 
members hi p o f the Un it ed Nat i ons . Whi le none of these 
Sou thern Asi an 1 ies has comm.on bord er s v.it .h eit n er Comm -
I 
n i s t Ch in a or th e Sovi et Union , the ef fe ct of Americ an 
t ie - u_ l~ t h them ha s been to dr ive t~eir ne i ghbo rs (who do 
h· v e common b or e r s ~:i th th Communist st a t es) to see !~ a 
nders and.:.ng with th e 11New Look ' s 11 enemies . The ri s e of 
Communi st i ifluen ce i n Afghan i s t an , Cambodia , Burma and 
In do n e sia , and the b i r th of th e Afro - Asi an tr en d to war ds 
a mor e r-S erti ve in ependen ce bo t h f r om t he ii e st and +he 
East ha ve been tr a ced ba cz,:. to the intru s io n of mer ic an 
arms in uo •th er n Asia. 
Whi le th e mi li t ary Value of t hese al lies to t he 
ni t ed St a te s i s 1uest io nab le..J the poli t icc::..l cost h as been 
tr emendous . •Y wilf u l ly i gnor~ng the f orces of re su r ~ent 
na~io nal is i n this are and by offeri ng purel y i l it ~r y 
sol ·ti.on s t o the area ' s basic a ly soci al and economic 
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